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User:Sayonzei/安哥拉獨立戰爭

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安哥拉獨立戰爭
葡萄牙殖民地战争、非洲的非殖民化、冷战的一部分

在安哥拉巡逻的葡萄牙军队
日期1961年2月4日 – 1974年4月25日（停火）
（13年2个月又3周）
1975年11月11日（独立）
地点
安哥拉
结果

葡萄牙军事上胜利

安人运、安解阵、安盟政治上胜利

参战方
安人运
安解阵
安盟
卡宾达飞地解放阵线（英语：Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda）		 葡萄牙 葡萄牙
 南非[1][2]
物资支持：
指挥官与领导者
阿戈什蒂纽·内图
Lúcio Lara（英语：Lúcio Lara）
奥尔登·罗贝托
若纳斯·萨文比		 葡萄牙 弗朗西斯科·達科斯塔·戈麥斯
兵力
90,000 65,000
伤亡与损失
大约10,000人丧生[20] 2,991人丧生（1,526人阵亡，1,465人非战斗死亡）[21]（葡萄牙政府统计数据）
9,000+受伤（其他来源）
4,684人永久残疾
30,000–50,000名平民丧生[22]
安哥拉目前的省份划分，与葡萄牙殖民时期基本相同。

安哥拉獨立戰爭（葡萄牙語：Guerra de Independência de Angola；1961–1974），安哥拉称为Luta Armada de Libertação Nacional（“民族解放武装斗争”），[23][24]源于棉花种植场工人反抗强迫耕作的起义，后扩大为三个民族主义组织和一个分离主义组织争夺安哥拉海外省控制权的多派别战争。[25]1974年4月葡萄牙发生康乃馨革命，推翻“新国家”政府，新政府随即停止所有在非洲殖民地的军事行动，并允许其独立，安哥拉独立战争因此结束。这场冲突常被视作葡萄牙海外战争的一个战区，与几内亚比绍独立战争（英语：Guinea-Bissau War of Independence）和莫桑比克独立战争并列。

安哥拉独立战争是一场游击战争，葡萄牙军队试图对分散在安哥拉广大人口稀少农村的各路武装组织进行“平叛”。[26]各派武装力量都在战争中犯下暴行。康乃馨革命发生前，葡萄牙军队已取得全面胜利，控制了安哥拉大部分地方。葡萄牙政府停战后，各民族主义组织间又爆发了武装冲突。最终于1975年1月，葡萄牙政府和安人运、安解阵、安盟签订了阿尔沃协议（英语：Alvor Agreement）。

背景 编辑

主条目：安哥拉历史和葡属西非

1482年，葡萄牙国王名下，由迪奥戈·康率领的帆船队到达了刚果王国。随后陆续有船队到刚果，两国的关系因此加深。葡萄牙人给刚果带来火器、新技术和基督教，刚果则给葡萄牙人送去奴隶、象牙和矿产。

1575年保羅·迪亞士·德·諾發伊斯建立了现在的罗安达，当时称 São Paulo da Assunção de Loanda（“圣保罗-阿松桑的罗安达”）。諾發伊斯带领一百户殖民者和四百名士兵占有一块土地，建起一座带防御工事的定居点。1605年葡萄牙皇家授予罗安达城市地位。后来葡萄牙陆续又建立一些居民点、要塞和港口，如1587年建立、1617年成镇的本格拉，也是葡萄牙早期的重要居民点。[27][28]

葡萄牙入侵初期，不时有和当地统治者之间发生战争、冲突或签订条约，这其中尤其以持续抵抗葡萄牙人入侵的恩津加女王最为突出。占领现在安哥拉全境的行动从19世纪开始，一直到20世纪20年代才完成。

1834年，安哥拉和其他葡萄牙海外领地获得海外省地位。从此在葡萄牙官方立场下，安哥拉等地和本土各省一样，是葡萄牙“不可分割的一部分”。1926-1951年，安哥拉的地位变更为“殖民地”（其本身又下分几个省），1951年6月11日恢复海外省地位。1971年葡萄牙宪法修订，赋予安哥拉更大的自治权，使其成为“安哥拉州”。[27][28]

虽然安哥拉的面积相当于法国和德国之和，但其人口密度很低，1960年总人口仅约500万，其中18万为白人，5.5万为混血人种，其他为黑人。20世纪70年代，安哥拉人口增至565万，其中45万为白人，6.5万为混血人种，其他为黑人。而根据政治学家Gerald Bender的数据，“……1974年末安哥拉的白人总数约为335,000，或稍比报告数字的一半要多。”[29]

安哥拉殖民政府由总督领导，总督兼有立法权和行政权，并直接对葡萄牙海外事务部负责。总督由内阁辅助，内阁由秘书长（担任副总督）和另几位省秘书组成。虽然总督负责管理警察和部队，但其没有军权，而是由安哥拉武装部队总司令承担。总司令直接对国防部长和武装部队总参谋负责。另有立法会，成员有政府直接任命，也有通过选举产生，在20世纪60-70年代立法职责逐渐上升。1972年改组为安哥拉立法议会。此外还有政府委员会，成员包括该高级政府官员，负责就总督的立法和行政职责提出建议。

1961年，安哥拉分为以下区: 卡宾达、刚果、罗安达、北宽扎、南宽扎、马兰热、隆达、本格拉、万博、比耶-宽多-库邦戈、莫希科、纳米贝和威拉。1962年，刚果区分为扎伊尔和威热两区，比耶-宽多-库邦戈区分为比耶和宽多-库邦戈两区。1970年，威拉区南部析出库内内区。每一区由区长领导，区议会为辅助。和葡萄牙本土的地方政府类似，区内下设市镇（concelho），再分为堂区（freguesias），分别由市议会（câmara municipal）和堂区议会（junta de freguesia）管理。在经济社会发展不完全的地方，市镇和堂区暂时以选区（circunscrições）和驻站（postos）代替，由政府任命官员管理。这些官员拥有较宽的权力，履行从行政、治安、卫生、经济乃至司法等角色。选区和驻站的行政长官领导本土巡警队。地方保留传统的土王、酋长，并将其纳入行政系统中，作为省政府与当地原住民之间的中间人。

交战方 编辑

葡萄牙军队 编辑

 
安哥拉北部雨林中的葡萄牙伞兵

葡萄牙方参战的主要为武装部队，也有安全部队和准军事部队。

武装部队 编辑

驻安哥拉的葡萄牙武装部队包括陆军、海军和空军，由安哥拉武装部队总司令指挥。1961年6月17日前还没有任命总司令，战争初期的联合指挥权由陆军将领Monteiro Libório（到1961年6月）和Silva Freire（1961年6-9月）行使。此后总司令的职位分别由以下将领担任：Venâncio Deslandes（1961–1962，兼任总督）、Holbeche Fino（1962–1963）、Andrade e Silva（1963–1965）、Soares Pereira（1965–1970）、弗朗西斯科·達科斯塔·戈麥斯（1970–1972）、Luz Cunha（1972–1974）和Franco Pinheiro（1974），除第一位出身空军外，其他均来自陆军。总司令担任战区指挥官，协调省内驻扎的三个军种的部队，各军种指挥官担任总司令助理。随着冲突的发展，总司令及其参谋人员的行动作用日益加强。1968年，在总司令直接控制下，建立了负责登博斯平叛工作的第一军区。从1970年起，各军区也由他直接控制，东部军区成为联合指挥部。战争开始时，派驻安哥拉的葡萄牙武装部队仅有约6500人，其中1500人来自葡萄牙本土，其余为当地士兵。而停战时，这个数字增加到了超过6.5万，葡萄牙人在武装部队中的比例也升至57.6%。

驻扎在安哥拉的葡萄牙地面部队组成葡萄牙陆军（英语：Portuguese Army）第三军区（1962年更名为“安哥拉军区”）。当时预计军区将包括五个下属的区域指挥部，但这些指挥部尚未启动。冲突开始时安哥拉的陆军部队部署是在1953年确定的。原先驻安哥拉军队的组织形式是以分散在各地的连级单位为基础，同时也执行国内安全任务。而当时葡萄牙不认为安哥拉内部会发生冲突，在军事上主要的关切是在欧洲大陆可能会和华约组织发生常规战争，因此部署转变为以三个步兵团和几个营级单位为基础，集中在主要城市中心，以便在发生常规战争时，能够组建一个远征野战师，从安哥拉部署到欧洲增援葡萄牙军队。不过这些团和其他部队大多是骨干力量，作为省内应征兵的训练中心。在冲突期间，他们负责培养当地招募的野战部队。除了当地组建的部队外，安哥拉的军队还包括从葡萄牙组建和派出的增援部队。这些部队均为过渡性质，大多数是义务兵（包括大部分尉官和士官），服役两年期满后即解散。绝大多数是轻步兵营和独立连，称为caçadores（葡萄牙语“猎人”之意）。These battalions and companies were designed to operate autonomously and isolated, without much support from the higher echelons, so having a strong service support component. They were deployed in a grid system (quadrícula) along the theatre of operations, with each one being responsible for a given area of responsibility. Usually, a regiment-sized agrupamento (battlegroup) commanded a sector, with this being divided in several sub-sectors, each constituting the area of responsibility of a caçadores battalion. Each battalion, in turn, had its field companies dispersed by the sub-sector, each with part of it as its area of responsibility. From 1962, four intervention zones (Northern, Central, Southern and Eastern) were established – renamed "military zones" in 1967 – each grouping several sectors. Due to the low scale guerrilla nature of the conflict, the caçadores company became the main tactical unit, with the standard organization in three rifle and one support platoons, being replaced by one based in four identical sub-units known as "combat groups". The Army also fielded regular units of artillery, armored reconnaissance, engineering, communications, signal intelligence, military police and service support. Besides the regular units, the Army also fielded units of special forces. Initially, these consisted of companies of special caçadores, trained for guerrilla and counter-insurgency warfare. The Army tried to extend the training of the special caçadores to all the light infantry units, so disbanding those companies in 1962. These proved however impracticable and soon other special forces were raised again in the form of the Commandos. The Commandos and a few specially selected caçadores units were not deployed in grid, but served instead as mobile intervention units under the direct control of the higher echelons of command. An unconventional force also fielded by Army was the Dragoons of Angola, a special counterinsurgency horse unit raised in the middle 1960s.

葡萄牙海军（英语：Portuguese Navy）部队由安哥拉海军司令部指挥，包括扎伊尔船队（有巡逻艇和登陆艇，在扎伊尔河活动）、直属船队（包括轮流部署于安哥拉的护卫舰），海军陆战队连和特种部队分队。海军陆战队连主要负责保护海军设施和舰艇，特种部队则专门进行两栖攻击。冲突之初，海军的主要着眼点在扎伊尔河，防止安哥拉北部的游击队从扎伊尔边境地区渗透入境。后来，海军也开始在远离大洋的东安哥拉河流中活动。

 
葡萄牙空军的一架SA330美洲狮直升机
 
20世纪60年代，罗安达空军基地，一架装载军需物资的葡萄牙F-84战斗机
 
葡萄牙空军的一架F-84战斗机

驻安哥拉的葡萄牙空军由第二军区指挥，总部设在罗安达。旗下有一个中央基地（罗安达的九号基地）和两个分基地（威热省内加热的三号基地和隆达省卡瓦略的四号基地）。宽多-库邦戈省塞尔帕平托的十号基地直到战争结束前才完工。基地控制下属的小机场，包括机动机场和备用机场。除此之外，空军也拥有一些其他的机场，如陆军卫戍区的机场，部分机场长期部署有空军分队。空军在安哥拉还安排有作为机动干预部队的空降兵二十一营，原是降落伞空降作战，后来改使用直升机进行空中攻击。The Air Force was supported by the voluntary air formations, composed of civil pilots, mainly from local flying clubs, who operated light aircraft mainly in air logistics support missions. In the beginning of the conflict, the Air Force had only a few aircraft stationed in Angola, including 25 F-84G jet fighter-bombers, six PV-2 Harpoon bombers, six Nord Noratlas transport aircraft, six Alouette II helicopters, eight T-6 light attack aircraft and eight Auster light observation aircraft. By the early 1970s, it had available four F-84G, six PV-2 Harpoon, 13 Nord Noratlas, C-47 and C-57 transport aircraft, 30 Alouette III and Puma helicopters, 18 T-6 and 26 Dornier Do 27 observation aircraft. Despite the increase, the number of aircraft was always too few to cover the enormous Angolan territory, besides many being old aircraft difficult to maintain in flying conditions. From the late 1960s, the Portuguese forces in southern Angola were able to count with the support of helicopters and some other air assets of the South African Air Force, with two Portuguese-South African joint air support centers being established.

安全部队 编辑

The security forces in Angola were under the control of the civil authorities, headed by the Governor-General of the province. The main of these forces engaged in the war was the Public Security Police (PSP) and the PIDE (renamed DGS in 1969). By the middle of the 1960s, these forces included 10,000 PSP constables and 1,100 PIDE agents.

The PSP was the uniformed preventive police of Angola. It was modeled after the European Portuguese PSP, but it covered the whole territory of the province, including its rural areas and not only the major urban areas as in the European Portugal. The PSP of Angola included a general-command in Luanda and district commands in each of the several district capitals, with a network of police stations and posts scattered along the territory. The Angolan PSP was reinforced with mobile police companies deployed by the European Portuguese PSP. The PSP also included the Rural Guard, which was responsible for the protection of farms and other agricultural companies. Besides this, the PSP was responsible to frame the district militias, which were employed mainly in the self-defense of villages and other settlements.

The PIDE (International and State Defense Police) was the Portuguese secret and border police. The PIDE Delegation of Angola, included a number of sub-delegations, border posts and surveillance posts. In the war, it operated as an intelligence service. The PIDE raised and controlled the Flechas, a paramilitary unit of special forces made up of natives. The Flechas were initially intended to serve mostly as trackers, but due to their effectiveness they were increasingly employed in more offensive operations, including pseudo-terrorist operations.

准军事部队和非常规部队 编辑

除了正规武装部队和安全部队外，葡萄牙方面还有准军事部队和非常规部队。有些受军方控制，其他的为安哥拉当局掌控。

The OPVDCA (Provincial Organization of Volunteers and Civil Defense of Angola) was a militia-type corps responsible for internal security and civil defense roles, with similar characteristics to those of the Portuguese Legion existing in European Portugal. It was under the direct control of the Governor-General of the province. Its origins was the Corps of Volunteers organized in the beginning of the conflict, which became the Provincial Organization of Volunteers in 1962, assuming also the role of civil defense in 1964, when it became the OPVDCA. It was made up of volunteers that served in part-time, most of these being initially whites, but latter becoming increasingly multi-racial. In the conflict, the OPVDCA was mainly employed in the defense of people, lines of communications and sensitive installations. It included a central provincial command and a district command in each of the Angolan districts. It is estimated that by the end of the conflict there were 20,000 OPVDCA volunteers.[來源請求]

The irregular paramilitary forces, included a number of different types of units, with different characteristics. Under military control, were the Special Groups (GE) and the Special Troops (TE). The GE were platoon-sized combat groups of special forces made up of native volunteers, that operated in Eastern Angola, usually attached to Army units. The TE had similar characteristics, but were made up of defectors from FNLA, operating in Cabinda and Northern Angola. Under the control of the civil authorities were the Fieis (Faithfuls) and the Leais (Loyals). The Fieis was a force made up mostly of exiled Katangese gendarmes from the Front for Congolese National Liberation, that opposed Mobutu regime, being organized in three battalions. The Leais was a force made up of political exiles from Zambia.

葡萄牙武装部队的种族、民族成分 编辑

从20世纪初到50年代，葡萄牙在其非洲属地维持着较为独立的殖民军队，主要由“本地军团”（companhias indígenas）组成。军官和高级士官来自葡萄牙本土军队，下级士官则从这些海外领地的葡萄牙移民中选拔。普通士兵的来源分为黑人志愿兵和白人义务兵。理论上“葡化”黑人也应入伍，但实际上只有少数人得到征召。[30]自1951年殖民地的身份变为海外省后，殖民军队失去了其单独地位，并入葡萄牙常规军，但海外省军队的招募、训练等没有太大改变。

根据莫桑比克历史学家若昂·保罗·博尔赫斯·科埃略（João Paulo Borges Coelho）的说法，[31]葡萄牙军队是按照种族和民族进行隔离的。到1960年，葡萄牙军队中有三类士兵：commissioned soldiers (European and African whites), overseas soldiers (black African assimilados or civilizados), and native soldiers (Africans who were part of the indigenato regime). These categories were renamed to 1st, 2nd and 3rd class in 1960 – which effectively corresponded to the same classification. Later, although skin colour ceased to be an official discrimination, in practice the system changed little – although from the late 1960s onward blacks were admitted as ensigns (alferes), the lowest rank in the hierarchy of commissioned officers.[32]

冲突爆发之初，黑人在殖民军士兵中的占比只有18%，战争中最高曾达到41%。科埃略指出，在安哥拉、几内亚和莫桑比克三国，葡萄牙指挥官对非洲士兵的看法差异很大。戈麦斯寻求与当地民众建立良好关系，将非洲士兵纳入正式的反叛乱作战编制中。相比之下，斯皮诺拉则希望在征召非洲士兵时，能够在政治及社会心理层面上有所作用。考尔扎在这三位中最为保守，他害怕非洲军团脱离他的控制，思想上也没有摆脱把非洲人视作低等生物的种族主义观念。[32]

Native African troops, although widely deployed, were initially employed in subordinate roles as enlisted troops or noncommissioned officers. As the war went on, an increasing number of native Angolans rose to positions of command, though of junior rank. After 500 years of colonial rule, Portugal had failed to produce any native black governors, headmasters, police inspectors, or professors; it had also failed to produce a single commander of senior commissioned rank in the overseas Army.

Here Portuguese colonial administrators fell victim to the legacy of their own discriminatory and limited policies in education, which largely barred indigenous Angolans from an equal and adequate education until well after the outbreak of the insurgency. By the early 1970s, the Portuguese authorities had fully perceived these flaws as wrong and contrary to their overseas ambitions in Portuguese Africa, and willingly accepted a true color blindness policy with more spending in education and training opportunities, which started to produce a larger number of black high ranked professionals, including military personnel.[來源請求]

民族主义和分离主义组织 编辑

安哥拉人民联盟/安解阵 编辑

主条目：安哥拉民族解放阵线

安解阵的前身“北安哥拉人民联盟”由奥尔登·罗贝托创建于1954年7月7日。罗贝托是古刚果王室后裔，出生于北安哥拉，自幼生活在比属刚果，并在当地的殖民当局工作。1958年该组织更名为“安哥拉人民联盟”（UPA）。1960年，罗贝托与安人运签订协议，两派共同对抗葡萄牙军队，但实际上没能实现。1962年，安哥拉人民联盟与安哥拉民主党合并，成立安哥拉民族解放阵线（FNLA，简称安解阵），持亲美反苏立场。同年创立安哥拉流亡革命政府（英语：Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile）（GRAE）。安哥拉人民联盟/安解阵受刚果人的支持。同时由于罗贝托和扎伊尔总统蒙博托·塞塞·塞科的亲属关系等原因，安解阵和比属刚果/扎伊尔也有十分密切的关系。

安解阵下属的军事部队称为“安哥拉民族解放军”（ELNA），主要支援来自刚果/扎伊尔，军队也在扎伊尔接受训练。此外，阿尔及利亚、美国也对其提供支持。虽然安解阵反共，但东欧国家也给其提供过不少武器。

安人运 编辑

主条目：安哥拉人民解放运动

安哥拉人民解放运动（安人运，MPLA）成立于1956年，是安哥拉非洲人联合斗争党（英语：Party of the United Struggle for Africans in Angola）（PLUA）和安哥拉共产党（PCA）合并而来。安人运是左翼政党，成员主要是安哥拉的混血、白人知识阶层和城市精英。支持者来自安本杜人和罗安达、本戈、南北宽扎、马兰热等省份的部族。党主席为阿戈什蒂纽·内图，总书记是维里亚托·达克鲁兹，两人都是接受过葡萄牙教育的城市知识分子。国际上，安人运最大的支援来自苏联和古巴。原本其希望得到美国的援助，但由于美国的援助目标已经是安哥拉人民联盟/安解阵而最终作罢。

安人运的武装力量称为“安哥拉人民解放军（英语：People's Armed Forces of Liberation of Angola）”（EPLA），最多时人数达到4500人左右。装备多为苏式，通过赞比亚接收，包括有TT-33手枪、PPS冲锋枪、AVS-36自动步枪、AK-47突击步枪、机枪、迫击炮、火箭推进榴弹、反坦克地雷及反步兵地雷。

安盟 编辑

主条目：争取安哥拉彻底独立全国联盟

争取安哥拉彻底独立全国联盟（安盟，UNITA）由前安解阵成员若纳斯·萨文比创立于1966年。萨文比出身安哥拉中南部的奥文本杜族，父亲是一名福音派牧师。在安解阵期间，萨文比担任安哥拉流亡革命政府外交部长，但后来他指责奥尔登·罗贝托勾结美国，双方爆发分歧，最后萨文比出走。

安盟的军事力量称为安哥拉解放军（英语：FALA）（FALA），但其人数少、装备差，致使萨文比只能和葡萄牙当局合作，更注重于打击安人运。战争结束时，安盟是唯一一个能在安哥拉本土维持军事活动的本土组织，其他的军事力量要么被葡萄牙军队消灭，要么出逃到了其他邻国。

卡宾达飞地解放阵线 编辑

主条目：卡宾达飞地解放阵线

卡宾达飞地解放阵线（FLEC）创建于1963年，由原卡宾达飞地解放运动（英语：Movement for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda）（MLEC）、卡宾达民族联盟行动委员会（英语：Action Committee of the Cabinda National Union）（CAUNC）和马永贝民族联盟（英语：Mayombe National Alliance）（ALLIAMA）合并而成。与前述三个组织不同，该组织的宗旨是将卡宾达飞地从安哥拉脱离出来成立独立国家，而不是追求安哥拉全国独立。卡宾达飞地解放阵线开始活动的时间早于葡萄牙撤出安哥拉，但其在军事上的活动基本是在这之后，和安哥拉武装、安全部队间的冲突。卡宾达飞地解放阵线直到现今仍然作为游击队活跃在周边地区。

东部叛乱武装 编辑

东部叛乱武装（RDL）was a dissident wing of the MPLA, created in 1973, under the leadership of Daniel Chipenda, in opposition to the line of Agostinho Neto. A second dissident wing was the Active Revolt, created at the same time.

战前形势 编辑

国际政治局势 编辑

在20世纪40年代末、50年代初的亚非殖民地，主要的国际政治关系标志是冷战和“风向的改变”。

1954年10月，阿尔及尔的连环爆炸拉开了阿尔及利亚战争的帷幕。法国向阿尔及利亚派兵40万，直到1962年战争结束。葡萄牙政府预见到将来其非洲属地也会出现类似的战争，因此给予极大的关注，派人学习法国人采取的平叛战术。

1955年，万隆会议在印度尼西亚展开。与会的29个亚非国家中，大部分在当时都才成立不久。万隆会议促进了亚非经济和文化合作，声明反对殖民主义和新殖民主义，这是向不结盟运动迈出的重要一步。

1955年12月，葡萄牙加入联合国后，秘书长向葡萄牙政府正式询问，其管辖范围内是否有非自治领土。按照当时葡萄牙政府的立场，所有海外省和欧洲本土一样，都是葡萄牙不可分割的一部分。因此葡萄牙政府的答复是，葡萄牙没有任何领土可以被定性为非自治领土，从而没有义务提供《联合国宪章》第七十三条所要求的任何信息。

1957年，夸梅·恩克鲁玛带领前英国殖民地黄金海岸（今名加纳）独立，成为二战后非洲第一个独立的前殖民地。1958年恩克鲁玛推动的非洲独立国家会议成为非洲反对殖民主义的一个新的信号。

安哥拉的北邻比属刚果于1960年独立成为刚果共和国（“刚果（利）”，后称“刚果（金）”，1971年后称扎伊尔共和国），但独立后不久即因为一系列的暴力骚乱导致出现了刚果危机。白人成为受打击的目标，超过8万名比利时裔居民被迫逃离刚果。莫伊兹·冲伯宣布加丹加从刚果独立。这场危机引起了联合国和比利时军队的干预，直到1965年蒙博托·塞塞·塞科上台后，刚果局势才缓和下来。

1961年1月20日，约翰肯尼迪就任美国总统。其政府开始支持非洲的民族主义运动，目的是中和苏联在非洲日益增长的影响。在安哥拉问题上，美国开始对安哥拉人民联盟给予直接支持，并对葡萄牙采取敌对态度，禁止葡萄牙在非洲使用美国武器。

1964年，肯尼思·卡翁达领导下的北罗德西亚独立成为赞比亚。至此，除西南非洲以外, 安哥拉已基本被与葡萄牙政权敌对的国家包围。

安哥拉国内政治情况和民族主义的兴起 编辑

 
现代非洲地图，安哥拉被标红

葡萄牙政府于1933年6月16日通过《葡萄牙殖民法案（英语：Portuguese Colonial Act）》，规定了各海外属地与本土之间的关系，1951年该法案被废除。法案反映了20世纪20年代末至30年代欧洲殖民国家对海外领地的普遍看法。法案生效期间，各海外属地失去了自1834年取得的“省”地位，改为“殖民地”，整个葡萄牙正式成为“葡萄牙殖民帝国”。《殖民法案》承认了葡萄牙人对各海外领地原住民的至高无上的地位，原住民虽然也能接受各种教育，但大多数传统原住民社区和生活在安哥拉的葡萄牙人之间存在着深刻的文化和社会差异，实际上明显处于不利地位。

因其强烈的帝国主义倾向，《殖民法案》开始受到质疑。1944年，前殖民地事务部长何塞·费雷拉·博萨（英语：José Ferreira Bossa）建议修改法案，包括把“殖民地”的称呼恢复成过去的“海外省”。1951年6月11日，葡萄牙国民议会通过了一项新法律，并最终否决了《殖民法案》。所有的原葡萄牙海外领地都恢复了省的地位，如安哥拉由原先的“安哥拉属地”（Colónia de Angola）恢复为“安哥拉省”（Província de Angola）。[27][28]

1948年，维里亚托·达克鲁兹等人创立弘扬安哥拉文化的组织“青年知识分子运动（英语：Movement of Young Intellectuals）”。此时安哥拉本土的民族主义者向联合国致信，呼吁在联合国监督下给予安哥拉保护国地位。

20世纪50年代，在萨拉查政府的鼓励下，葡萄牙人掀起了新一轮在包括安哥拉海外省在内的葡属非洲的定居浪潮。[33]

1953年，安哥拉分离主义者建立了第一个以安哥拉独立为宗旨的政党“安哥拉非洲人联合斗争党（英语：Party of the United Struggle for Africans in Angola）”（PLUA）。1954年，比属刚果和安哥拉的刚果民族主义者创建了“北安哥拉人民联盟”（UPA），推动原刚果王国地区的独立。[34]

During 1955, Mário Pinto de Andrade and his brother Joaquim formed the Angolan Communist Party (PCA). In December 1956 PLUA merged with the PCA to form the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). The MPLA, led by da Cruz, Mário Andrade, Ilidio Machado, and Lúcio Lara, derived support from the Ambundu and in Luanda.[35][36][37][38]

In March 1959, when inaugurating the new military shooting range of Luanda, the Governor-General of Angola, Sá Viana Rebelo, makes the famous Shooting Range Speech, where he predicts a possible conflict in Angola.

General Monteiro Libório assumes the command of the land forces of Angola, with prerogatives of commander-in-chief, in September 1959. He would be the Portuguese military commander in office when the conflict erupts.

Álvaro Silva Tavares assumes the office of Governor-General of Angola in January 1960, being the holder of the office when the conflict erupts.

During January 1961, Henrique Galvão, heading a group of operatives of the DRIL oppositionist movement, hijacked the Portuguese liner Santa Maria. The intention of Galvão was to set sail to Angola, where he would disembark and establish a rebel Portuguese government in opposition to Salazar, but he was forced to head to Brazil, where he liberated the crew and passengers in exchange for political asylum.

Feeling the need of having forces trained in counter-insurgency operations, the Portuguese Army creates the Special Operations Troops Centre in April 1960, where companies of special forces (baptized "special caçadores") start to be prepared. The first three companies of special caçadores (CCE) are dispatched to Angola in June 1960, mainly due to the Congo Crisis. Their main mission was to protect the Angolan regions bordering the ex-Belgian Congo, each being stationed in Cabinda (1st CCE), in Toto, Uíge (2nd CCE) and Malanje (3rd CCE).

卡桑杰起义 编辑

Although usually considered as an event that predates the Angolan War of Independence, some authors consider the Baixa de Cassanje revolt (also known as the "Maria's War") as the initial event of that Conflict. It was a labour conflict, not related with the claiming for the independence of Angola. The Baixa do Cassanje was a rich agricultural region of the Malanje District, bordering the ex-Belgian Congo, with approximately the size of the Mainland Portugal, which was the origin of most of the cotton production of Angola. The region's cotton fields were in the hands of the Cotonang - General Company of the Cottons of Angola, a company mostly held by Belgian capital and which employed many natives. Despite its contribution for the development of the region, Cotonang had been accused several times of disrespecting the labour legislation regarding working conditions of its employees, causing it to become under the investigation of the Portuguese authorities, but with no relevant actions against it being yet taken.

Feeling discontent with Cotonang, in December 1960, many of its workers started to boycott work, demanding better working conditions and higher wages. The discontent was seized by infiltrated indoctrinators of the Congolese PSA (African Solidarity Party) to foment an uprising of the local peoples. At that time, the only Portuguese Army unit stationed in the region was the 3rd Special Caçadores Company (3rd CCE), tasked with the patrolling and protection of the border with the ex-Belgian Congo. Despite receiving complains from local whites who felt their security threatened, the Governor of the Malanje District, Júlio Monteiro – a mixed race Cape Verdean – did not authorize the 3rd CCE to act against the rebels and also forbade the acquisition of self-defense weapons by the white population. From 9 to 11 January 1961, the situation worsened, with the murder of a mixed race Cotonang foreman and with the surrounding of a 3rd CCE patrol by hundreds of rebels. Finally, on 2 February, the clashes between the rebels and the security forces erupted, with the first shots being fired, causing 11 deaths. By that time, the uprising had spread to the whole Malanje District and threatened to spread to the neighboring districts. The rebel leaders took advantage of the superstitious beliefs of most of their followers to convince them that the bullets of the Portuguese military forces were made of water and so could do no harm. Presumably due to this belief, the rebels, armed with machetes and canhangulos (home-made shotguns), attacked the military en masse, in the open field, without concern for their own protection, falling under the fire of the troops.

Given the limitations of the 3rd CCE to deal with the uprising in such a large region, the Command of the 3rd Military Region in Luanda decided to organize an operation with a stronger military force to subjugate it. A provisional battalion under the command of Major Rebocho Vaz was organized by the Luanda Infantry Regiment, integrating the 3rd CCE, the 4th CCE (stationed in Luanda) and the 5th CCE (that was still en route from the Metropole to Angola). On 4 February, the 4th CCE was already embarked in the train ready to be dispatched to Malanje, when an uprising at Luanda erupted, with several prisons and Police facilities being stormed. Despite the indefinite situation at Luanda and despite having few combat units available there, General Libório, commander of the 3rd Military Region decided to go forward with the sending of the 4th CCE to Malanje, which arrived there on 5 February. The provisional battalion started gradually the operations to subdue the uprising.

The land forces were supported by the Portuguese Air Force, which employed Auster light observation and PV-2 ground attack aircraft. The military forces were able to assume the control of the region by 11 February. By the 16th, the provisional battalion was finally reinforced with the 5th CCE which had been held in Luanda as a reserve force after disembarking in Angola. Baixa do Cassanje was officially considered pacified on 27 February. The anti-Portuguese forces claimed that, during the subduing of the uprising, the Portuguese military bombed villages in the area, using napalm and killing between 400 and 7000 natives. However, the Portuguese military reported that no napalm was ever used in the operations and that the number of rebels dead was inferior to 300, plus 100 registered injured treated at the Malanje Hospital. The military forces suffered two dead and four injured.

After the subdue of the uprising, the Portuguese military pressed the Government-General of Angola to take actions to improve the working conditions of the Cotonang employees in order to solve definitely the situation. The Governor-General Silva Tavares took measures to calm down the situation and on 2 May 1961, the Government decreed the change of the labor legislation related with cotton culture. Apparently, these measures were successful in deeply reducing the discontent among the laborers of the Baixa de Cassanje, with the region remaining peaceful even after the UPA attacks of 15 March 1961.[39][40][41]

2月4日及10日罗安达事件 编辑

关于1961年2月4日和10日事件的事实，由于各方的宣传和信息的相互矛盾，仍有许多不清楚的地方。

At a time when Luanda was full of foreign journalists that were covering the possible arriving at Angola of the hijacked liner Santa Maria and with the Baixa de Casanje revolt on its peak, on the early morning of 4 February 1961, a number of black militants, mostly armed with machetes, ambushed a Public Security Police (PSP) patrol-car and stormed the Civil Jail of São Paulo, the Military Detection House and the PSP Mobile Company Barracks, with the apparent objective of freeing political prisoners that were being held in those facilities. They were not able to storm other planned targets like the Airport, the National Broadcast Station, post office and military barracks. Different sources indicate the number of militants evolved in the several attacks as being between 50 and several hundreds. The militants were able to kill the crew of the patrol-car, taking their weapons, but their assaults against the several facilities was repulsed, not being able to release any prisoners. In the assaults, the security forces suffered seven dead, including five white and one black police constables and a white Army corporal, besides having several seriously injured elements. Different sources indicate between 25 and 40 attackers killed.

The MPLA always officially claimed to be the originator of the attacks. However, the MPLA origin of the attacks is contested. Several sources indicate the Angolan nationalist mixed race priest Manuel das Neves as the perpetrator of the attacks. Apparently this was also the PIDE theory, which arrested and sent him to the Metropole, where he was interned in religious houses.

An emotional funeral for the deceased police constables was held on 5 February, which was attended by thousands of persons, the majority being white inhabitants of Luanda. During the funeral, riots broke out, which would cause additional dead. There are several contradictory versions of what happened. The anti-Portuguese line states that the riots were originated by the whites, who desired to revenge the dead police constables, committing random acts of violence against the ethnic black majority living in Luanda's slums (musseques).[42] Contrary versions state that the riots were caused when provocative shots were fired near the cemetery where the funeral was being held, causing panic among the attendants. The riots caused a number of dead, which number varies accordingly with the sources. The anti-Portuguese line describes a massacre carried away by the white inhabitants and the security forces, with hundreds of blacks being killed. Following this line of thought:

The Portuguese vengeance was awesome. The police helped civilian vigilantes organise nightly slaughters in the Luanda slums. The whites hauled Africans from their flimsy one-room huts, shot them and left their bodies in the streets. A Methodist missionary... testified that he personally knew of the deaths of almost three hundred.

——John Marcum[43]

However, other sources refer that the theory of the massacre is mere anti-Portuguese false propaganda and that only 19 persons died in the riots. Following this line:

During the funeral of the PSP constables, which reached a gigantic manifestation of grief, with the cemetery full of people, shots were heard outside that caused the widespread panic, especially in the interior, where people practically did not fit. In the ensuing confusion, and of the firing fired, resulted nineteen dead and numerous wounded, incident that gave rise to another myth of massacre, that would have reached hundreds of dead, wounded and imprisoned, completely false numbers. It must be said that many of these people were probably disarmed, even the force that was going to make the salvos of the order, to accompany the highest individualities of Luanda and that it was a military vehicle called on the occasion, that came to the place, and ended the generalized disorder. Also nobody explained, until today, who initiated these disturbances and fired the first shots.

——A.L. Pires Nunes[44]

2月10日，又发生一场针对圣保罗监狱的类似袭击。不过这次安全部队提前做好准备，无人死亡，还击毙22名袭击者。随后也有其他相似的袭击计划，但都被安全部队发现并破获。

战争过程 编辑

开端 编辑

 
在罗安达参加阅兵的葡萄牙殖民军队
主条目：葡萄牙殖民地战争
 
安哥拉人民联盟的徽章

On 15 March 1961, the Union of Peoples of Angola (UPA), under the leadership of Holden Roberto, launched an incursion into northern Angola from its base in the Congo-Léopoldville (ex-Belgian Congo), leading 4000 to 5000 militants. His forces took farms, government outposts, and trading centers, killing and mutilating officials and civilians, most of them Ovimbundu "contract workers" from the Central Highlands. It was the start of the Angolan War of Independence and of the wider Portuguese Overseas War.[45] UPA militants stormed the Angolan districts of Zaire, Uíge, Cuanza Norte and Luanda, massacring the civilian population during their advance, killing 1,000 whites and 6,000 blacks (women and children included of both white European and black African descent). Besides the killing of people, the UPA militants destroyed the infrastructures they found on their way, including houses, farms, roads and bridges, creating a general chaos and panic. The terrified populations took refuge in the forests or fled to nearby regions and to Congo-Léopoldville.[38][46][47][48]

However and contrary to the expectations of the UPA, the majority of the white inhabitants that were able to survive the initial attacks did not flee, except some women and children that were evacuated to Luanda. Instead, they entrenched themselves in several towns and villages of the region – including Carmona, Negage, Sanza Pombo, Santa Cruz, Quimbele and Mucaba – resisting the assaults almost without the support of the few existent military forces.[49]

On the same 15 March and on the 16th, the 7th and the 9th Special Caçadores companies and the 1st Paratrooper Company are dispatched from the Metropole to Angola by air. Other small units of the same type are dispatched in the following days. Also, small military columns leave Luanda and Carmona to try to rescue some of the isolated populations of the areas under the UPA attacks. On 21 March, the Provisional Battalion of Major Rebocho Vaz – which has acted in the Baixa de Cassange revolt – moves to Cuanza Norte to face the UPA advances.

Without relevant military reinforcements arrived from the Metropole, on 28 March, the Corps of Volunteers of Angola is created, in order to officially frame the civil volunteers that were already fighting UPA.

On the early April, the Massacre of Cólua occurs. The village of Cólua, near Aldeia Viçosa, Uíge had been attacked and its inhabitants massacred by UPA. A military column from the Provisional Battalion is sent to the village to try to collect the dead bodies. However an isolated group of soldiers (including two officers) which remained behind is ambushed, with their bodies being latter found horribly mutilated. Another military patrol that was sent to the area is also ambushed, with some of their members falling into UPA's hands and being also tortured, mutilated and killed. 30 civilians and 11 military are eventually killed at Cólua. Later testimonies refer that the UPA militants practiced acts of cannibalism, eating parts of the dead bodies of the soldiers. The Cólua events had an important psychological effect in the Portuguese forces, not only due to horrifying acts practiced against its soldiers, but also because they realized that the insurgents now dared to attack military forces and not just defenseless civilians.[50]

On 11 April, the Minister of National Defense Júlio Botelho Moniz – discontent with the attitude of Prime Minister Salazar regarding the Overseas policy and the conflict in Angola – leads a coup d'état attempt, which however fails. Following the aborted coup and now realizing that the conflict in Angola was more serious than what was initially thought, Prime Minister Salazar dismisses Botelho Moniz and assumes himself the Defense portfolio. On 13 April, Salazar speaks on television about the situation in Angola, using the famous phrase Para Angola, rapidamente e em força (To Angola, rapidly and in force). As part of the Government remodeling, Adriano Moreira is appointed Overseas Minister, initiating a series of liberal reforms in the Portuguese Overseas territories.

A strong military mobilization is now initiated by the Portuguese Armed Forces. Finally, on 21 March, the first important military contingent from the Metropole (including the Caçadores battalions 88 and 92) embark in the ocean liner Niassa, arriving at Luanda on 2 May. The cargo ship Benguela also departs to Angola, carrying war material. In a demonstration of force, the military units recently arrived at Luanda parade along the main avenue of the city.

On 13 May, the units arrived from the Metropole start to move to Northern Angola, to occupy strategic positions. Until June, Army units are positioned in Damba, Sanza Pombo, São Salvador do Congo and Cuimba, while Fuzileiros (Marines) occupy Tomboco. Due to the blocked roads, destroyed bridges and ambushes, the movement of the units is slow, with the Portuguese forces suffering numerous casualties. After occupying these positions, the Portuguese units initiate the gradual re-occupation of the areas controlled by UPA.

In June, the Air Force General Augusto Venâncio Deslandes is appointed Governor-General of Angola, replacing Silva Tavares. Also, General António Libório is replaced by General Carlos Silva Freire in the role of commander of the 3rd Military Region (commander of land forces of Angola). General Silva Freire will maintain prerogatives of joint Commander-in-Chief until September, when Venâncio Deslandes is also appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Angola, accumulating this role with that of Governor-General.

On 10 July, the Portuguese forces initiate its first major operation of the conflict, this being Operation Viriato (Viriathus), aimed at re-conquering the town of Nambuangongo, in the Dembos forest, which had been proclaimed by UPA as its capital. The operation was still planned as a conventional-type maneuver, with Caçadores battalions 96 and 114 and Cavalry Squadron 149 converging in Nambuangongo through three axes of attack, with the support of artillery, engineering and air forces. On 9 August, the vanguard of the Battalion 96 of Lieutenant-Colonel Armando Maçanita finally arrives and re-occupies Nambuagongo. In their advance, the three military units suffer 75 casualties, including 21 dead.

The Portuguese forces now focus in the re-occupation of the village of Quipedro, in order to eliminate the rebellious forces in the area and to cut of their flight from Nambuangongo to the North, as a follow-up of Operation Viriato. For this, they will carry away Operation Nema, which will include the first airborne assault in combat of the Portuguese military history. The Operation is carried away between 11 and 21 August, with the 1st Company of the recently created Paratroopers Battalion 21 of Angola jumping by parachute over the target, after preparation air strikes. The rebellious were taken by surprise, with the Paratroopers being able to occupy Quipedro almost without resistance. They then built an improvised runway and waited for the arriving of Cavalry Squadron 149 that was advancing by land from Nambuangongo.

In August, by order of General Silva Freire, the Northern Intervention Zone (ZIN) is created, encompassing the districts of Luanda, Cabinda, Uige, Zaire, Malange and Cuanza Norte, replacing the so-called "Northern Uprising Zone". Despite not existing still a conflict in this area, an Eastern Intervention Zone (ZIL) – covering the districts of Lunda and Moxico – is also created in the following month.

As part of his reforms, Minister Adriano Moreira decrees the repulsion of the Statute of the Portuguese Indigenous of the Provinces of Guinea, Angola and Mozambique on 6 August. With the abolition of this Statute, all Angolans, independently of their race, education, religion and costumes, achieve identical Portuguese citizenship rights and obligations.

On 10 April, the Operation Esmeralda (Emerald) – aimed at cleaning and retaking the control of Pedra Verde, UPA's last base in northern Angola – is initiated by the Special Caçadores Battalion 261, supported by paratroopers, artillery, armored cars and aviation elements. The initial assault is repulsed by the UPA forces, with the Portuguese suffering important casualties. The Portuguese regrouped and, days latter, launch a second assault, finally taking control of Pedra Verde on 16 September.

On 9 June, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 163, declaring Angola a non-self-governing territory and calling on Portugal to desist from repressive measures against the Angolan people. The resolution was approved with the votes of China, United States, Soviet Union and of all the non-permanent members, with the abstaining of France and the United Kingdom.[51]

The major military operations finally terminate on 3 October, when a platoon of the Artillery Company 100 reoccupies Caiongo, in the circle of Alto Cauale, Uíge, the last abandoned administrative post that remained unrecovered. This reoccupation ended the almost six months period during which the UPA fighters were able to control a geographic area with four times the size of European Portugal.

In a speech made on 7 October, the Governor-General and Commanding-in-Chief Venâncio Deslandes announces the termination of the military operations and that from then only police operations would be carried out, although partly in military scope.

During an air reconnaissance in southern Angola on 10 November, the aircraft that was carrying General Silva Freire and his staff crashes, killing him and almost all the officers of the headquarters of the land forces of Angola. Because of this crash, General Francisco Holbeche Fino is appointed commander of the 3rd Military Region.

In the first year of the war 20,000 to 30,000 Angolan civilians[22][52] were killed by Portuguese forces and between 400,000 and 500,000 refugees went to Zaïre. UPA militants joined pro-independence refugees and continued to launch attacks from across the border in Zaire, creating more refugees and terror among local communities.[38][47] A UPA patrol took 21 MPLA militants prisoners and then executed them on 9 October 1961 in the Ferreira incident, sparking further violence between the two sides.[47]

Holden Roberto merged UPA with the Democratic Party of Angola (PDA) to form the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA) in March 1962. A few weeks later he established the Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile (GRAE) on 27 March, appointing Jonas Savimbi to the position of Foreign Minister. Roberto established a political alliance with Zairian President Mobutu Sese Seko by divorcing his wife and marrying a woman from Mobutu's wife's village.[53][54] Roberto visited Israel and received aid from the Israeli government from 1963 to 1969.[55][56]

The MPLA held a party congress in Leopoldville in 1962, during which, Viriato da Cruz – found to be slow, negligent, and adverse to planning – was replaced by Agostinho Neto. In addition to the change in leadership, the MPLA adopted and reaffirmed its policies for an independent Angola:[35]

由于罗贝托不愿将战火蔓延至刚果王国以外的地区，萨文比于1964年离开安解阵并建立了安盟。[57]1965年，内图与切·格瓦拉会面，很快得到了来自古巴、东德和苏联的资金支持。[58]

开启东部战线 编辑

In May 1966 Daniel Chipenda, then a member of MPLA, established the Frente Leste (Eastern Front), significantly expanding the MPLA's reach in Angola. When the EF collapsed, Chipenda and Neto each blamed the other's factions.[47]

UNITA carried out its first attack on 25 December 1966, preventing trains from passing through the 本格拉铁路 at Teixeira de Sousa on the border with Zambia. 安盟在1967年又两次毁坏铁路，这惹恼了赞比亚政府，因为赞比亚通过这条铁路出口铜产品。作为回应，赞比亚总统肯尼思·卡翁达下令驱逐安盟的500名军事人员。Savimbi moved to Cairo, Egypt, where he lived for a year. 他从赞比亚秘密潜入安哥拉，and worked with the Portuguese military against the MPLA.[35][58]

UNITA had its main base in distant south-eastern Angolan provinces, where the Portuguese and FNLA influence were for all practical purposes very low, and where there was no guerrilla war at all. UNITA was from the beginning far better organized and disciplined than either the MPLA or the FNLA[59]. Its fighters also showed a much better understanding of guerrilla operations.[60] They were especially active along the Benguela railway, repeatedly causing damage to the Portuguese, and to the Republic of Congo and Zambia, both of which used the railway for transportation of their exports to Angolan ports.

On 19 May 1968, FNLA entered in Eastern Angola and carried away its first violent actions in the region against the local populations.

During October 1968, the Portuguese forces carry away Operation Vitória (Victory) against the MPLA, assaulting and destroying its main bases at Eastern Angola. Among others, the Mandume III base (headquarters of the MPLA's III Military Region) is assaulted by the Portuguese Commandos, leading to the capture of important documents.

During the late 1960s the FNLA and MPLA fought each other as much as they did the Portuguese, with MPLA forces assisting the Portuguese in finding FNLA hideouts.[58]

In the late 1969, the Portuguese forces organize the Battle Group Sirocco (Agrupamento Siroco), a highly mobile composite task force aimed at hunting and destroying the guerrilla forces operating in Eastern Angola. The land component of the task force is centered in Commando companies, being supported by an air component with helicopters and light aircraft. On 1 September, Battle Group Sirocco initiates a long series of highly successful operations in the Eastern region. Battle Group Sirocco (remodeled as Sirocco 1970 and Sirocco 1971, respectively in 1970 and 1971) would be active for three years, in 1972 being replaced by the similar Battle Group Ray (Agrupamento Raio).

葡萄牙重新聚焦东部 编辑

The MPLA began forming squadrons of 100 to 145 militants in 1971. These squadrons, armed with 60 mm and 81 mm mortars, attacked Portuguese outposts. The Portuguese conducted counter-insurgency sweeps against MPLA forces in 1972, destroying some MPLA camps. Additionally, the South African Defence Force engaged the MPLA forces in Moxico in February 1972, destroying the Communist presence. The Portuguese Armed Forces organised a successful campaign to control and pacify the entire Eastern Front (the Frente Leste). Neto, defeated, retreated with 800 militants to the Republic of the Congo. Differing factions in the MPLA then jockeyed for power, until the Soviet Union allied with the Chipenda faction. On 17 March 1,000 FNLA fighters mutinied in Kinkuzu, but the Zairian army put down the rebellion on behalf of Roberto.[61]

 
1973年，安解阵士兵在扎伊尔营地训练

In 1973 Chipenda left the MPLA, founding the Eastern Revolt with 1,500 former MPLA followers. Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere convinced the People's Republic of China, which had begun funding the MPLA in 1970, to ally with the FNLA against the MPLA in 1973. Roberto visited the PRC in December and secured Chinese support. The Soviet Union cut off aid to the MPLA completely in 1974 when Revolta Activa split off from the mainstream MPLA. In November the Soviet Union resumed aid to the MPLA after Neto reasserted his leadership.[47][58]

1974年4月25日，葡萄牙军队中的一个中下级军官组织“武装部队运动”发动康乃馨革命，终结了葡萄牙殖民地战争，让葡萄牙的海外领地有了独立的机会。[62][26][63]The MFA overthrew the Lisbon government in protest against the authoritarian political regime and the ongoing African colonial wars, specially the particularly demanding conflict in Portuguese Guinea.[64] The revolutionary Portuguese government removed the remaining elements of its colonial forces and agreed to a quick handover of power to the nationalist African movements. This put an immediate end to the independence war against Portugal, but opened the door for a bitter armed conflict among the independentist forces and their respectives allies. Holden Roberto, Agostinho Neto, and Jonas Savimbi met in Bukavu, Zaire in July and agreed to negotiate with the Portuguese as one political entity, but afterwards the fight broke out again.

结束 编辑

安人运、安解阵、安盟三党领导于1975年1月5日，在肯尼亚蒙巴萨再次会晤，同意停止互相争斗，并准备和葡萄牙方面进行谈判。1月10至15日，他们与葡萄牙政府官员在阿尔沃进行会议，会后签订阿尔沃协议（英语：Alvor Agreement），确定安哥拉将于11月11日独立，并组建过渡政府。[65]

协议的签订标志着独立战争的结束，和局势开始向内战的转变。卡宾达飞地解放阵线（英语：Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda）和东部叛乱武装没能参与谈判和签订协议。与此同时，联合政府很快就fell as nationalist factions, doubting one another's commitment to the peace process, tried to take control of the colony by force.[38][65]

The parties agreed to hold the first assembly elections in October 1975. From 31 January until independence a transitional government consisting of the Portuguese High Commissioner Rosa Coutinho and a Prime Ministerial Council would rule. The PMC consisted of three representatives, one from each Angolan party, and a rotating premiership among the representatives. Every decision required two-thirds majority support. The twelve ministries were divided equally among the Angolan parties and the Portuguese government: three ministries for each party. Author Witney Wright Schneidman criticized this provision in Engaging Africa: Washington and the Fall of Portugal's Colonial Empire for ensuring a "virtual paralysis in executive authority". The Bureau of Intelligence and Research cautioned that an excessive desire to preserve the balance of power in the agreement hurt the transitional Angolan government's ability to function.[38][65][66]

The Portuguese government's main goal in negotiations was preventing the mass emigration of white Angolans. Paradoxically, the agreement only allowed the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA to nominate candidates to the first assembly elections, deliberately disenfranchising Bakongo, Cabindans, and whites. The Portuguese reasoned that white Angolans would have to join the separatist movements and the separatists would have to moderate their platforms to expand their political bases.[66]

The agreement called for the integration of the militant wings of the Angolan parties into a new military, the Angolan Defense Forces. The ADF would have 48,000 active personnel, made up of 24,000 Portuguese and 8,000 MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA fighters respectively. Each party maintained separate barracks and outposts. Every military decision required the unanimous consent of each party's headquarters and the joint military command. The Portuguese forces lacked equipment and commitment to the cause, while Angolan nationalists were antagonistic of each other and lacked training.[65][66] The treaty, to which the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC) never agreed, described Cabinda as an "integral and inalienable part of Angola". Separatists viewed the agreement as a violation of Cabindan right to self-determination.[67]

All three parties soon had forces greater in number than the Portuguese, endangering the colonial power's ability to keep the peace. Factional fighting renewed, reaching new heights as foreign supplies of arms increased. In February the Cuban government warned the Eastern Bloc that the Alvor Agreement would not succeed. By spring the African National Congress and the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) were echoing Cuba's warning.[68] Leaders of the Organization of African Unity organized a peace conference moderated by Kenyan President Jomo Kenyatta with the three leaders in Nakuru, Kenya in June. The Angolan leaders issued the Nakuru Declaration on 21 June,[69] agreeing to abide by the provisions of the Alvor Agreement while acknowledging a mutual lack of trust which led to violence.

In July fighting again broke out and the MPLA managed to force the FNLA out of Luanda; UNITA voluntarily withdrew from the capital to its stronghold in the south from where it also engaged in the struggle for the country. By August the MPLA had control of 11 of the 15 provincial capitals, including Cabina and Luanda.[70] On 12 August, Portugal began airlifting more than 200,000 white Portuguese Angolans from Luanda to Lisbon, via "Operation Air Bridge". South African forces invaded Angola on 23 October 1975,[71] covertly sending 1,500 to 2,000 troops from Namibia into southern Angola. FNLA-UNITA-South African forces took five provincial capitals, including Novo Redondo and Benguela in three weeks. On 10 November the Portuguese left Angola. Cuban-MPLA forces defeated South African-FNLA forces, maintaining control over Luanda. On 11 November Neto declared the independence of the People's Republic of Angola.[65] The FNLA and UNITA responded by proclaiming their own government based in Huambo.[19] The South African Army retreated and, with the help of Cuban forces, the MPLA retook most of the south in the beginning of 1976.

Many analysts have blamed the transitional government in Portugal for the violence that followed the Alvor Agreement, criticizing the lack of concern about internal Angolan security, and the favoritism towards the MPLA. High Commissioner Coutinho, one of the seven leaders of the National Salvation Junta, openly gave Portuguese military equipment to MPLA forces.[19][65][66] Edward Mulcahy, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs in the United States State Department, told Tom Killoran, the U.S. Consul General in Angola, to congratulate the PMC rather than the FNLA and UNITA on their own and Coutinho for Portugal's "untiring and protracted efforts" at a peace agreement.[66][72] Secretary of State Henry Kissinger considered any government involving the pro-Soviet, communist MPLA, to be unacceptable and President Gerald Ford oversaw heightened aid to the FNLA.[35]

外国的影响 编辑

美国 编辑

安哥拉的冲突很快让许多外国势力，尤其是葡萄牙的北约盟国们担心起来。比如美国就担心安哥拉可能会建立起共产主义国家，因此其开始向安哥拉人民联盟（安解阵）提供武器弹药支持。[73]

然而安解阵的领导人不满足于美国提供的支持。萨文比和中华人民共和国建立了良好关系，从中国得来的物资比美国输送的还要多。1965年初，美国批准图森的Aero Associates公司向葡萄牙出售7架A-26入侵者轰炸机（英语：Douglas B-26 Invader），尽管葡萄牙担心该公司支持来自古巴和苏联的共产党人。

这7架轰炸机由据报为前英国皇家空军的约翰·理查德·霍克（John Richard Hawke）执飞前往安哥拉。在其中一次飞行中由于他飞越白宫时距离太低，被美国空军截停并逮捕。1965年5月霍克被控对葡萄牙非法出售武器，但只入狱了不到一年。这批轰炸机直到数年后才在安哥拉得到部署。[74]

罗德西亚、南非 编辑

除了美国之外，罗德西亚和南非这两个白人政府领导的非洲国家也参与了战争。两国政府担心若葡萄牙战败，其处境将往负面的方向发展。起初这两国的参与仅限于运输武器和补给，但1968年南非开始向葡萄牙空军提供云雀III型直升机和机组人员，到后来更是直接把南非国防军的几个步兵连派往安哥拉的中南部。[75]有报道称南非国防军曾负责守卫卡辛加（英语：Cassinga）的铁矿，但没有被证实。

曾有报告称，一批罗德西亚飞行员被招募来驾驶葡萄牙空军的直升机。然而，当1969年葡萄牙空军刚刚开始装备SA330美洲狮直升机时，机组人员基本都来自南非。罗德西亚空军认为本国的飞行员很重要，不能派去支援葡萄牙。南非支援的飞行员和直升机不受葡萄牙联合空中支援中心（Centro Conjunto de Apoio Aéreo）的控制。

苏联 编辑

20世纪60年代末，苏联开始通过安人运介入安哥拉的战争。此时安解阵只能从美国得到十分有限的武器，安盟几乎没从国外得到什么支持，而安人运因为和莫斯科方面发展了亲近的关系，很快就开始通过坦桑尼亚、赞比亚得到大量的武器。[76][77]

1969年，安人运和苏联达成协议，以独立后苏联能在安哥拉境内建造军事基地为条件，换取苏联向其交付武器和物资。因此到20世纪70年代初，安人运就成为了安哥拉最大的反殖民组织和最强大的政党。

后续 编辑

在安人运和葡萄牙签署权力移交协议的消息流出之后，大批人员开始逃离安哥拉。11月，超过30万人搭乘葡萄牙航空航班前往别国，另有约6,000人登上英国皇家航空的飞机离境。At this stage, the Angolan Civil War had started and spread out across the newly independent country. The devastating civil war lasted several decades and claimed a million lives and refugees in independent Angola.[78]

In the wake of the conflict, Angola faced deterioration in central planning, economic development and growth, security, education and health system issues.和其他刚从葡萄牙殖民地战争独立的国家相似，安哥拉的人类发展指数和人均GDP都显著下降。独立后的社会经济衰退、政治腐败、贫穷与贫富差距拉大，以及计划经济的失败，使得独立后的安哥拉与当初的设想差距甚远。[79][80] A level of economic development comparable to what had existed under Portuguese rule became a major goal for the governments of the independent territory. The sharp recession and the chaos in many areas of Angolan life eroded the initial impetus of nationalistic fervor. There were also eruptions of black racism in the former overseas province against white and mulatto Angolans.[81]

参见 编辑

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