認知的封閉

科學哲學和心靈哲學中，認知的封閉是指，人類的心靈是沒有能力解決一些討論了很久的哲學問題的。^[1] 歐文·弗蘭納根（英語：Owen Flanagan）把這種立場叫做非建設性自然主義。新神秘主義的首提倡者柯林·麥金（英語：Colin McGinn），^[2]^[3]稱其爲先驗自然主義，承認解決方法可能只能由某種非人類智慧生物提出。根據麥金，難以解決的哲學問題包括心物問題、人格同一性、意義問題（英語：meaning (philosophy of language)）、自由意志以及知識論，無論是從先天證明的角度，還是從經驗主義的立場^[4]。

人物

柯林·麥金

哈耶克：對於弗里德里希·哈耶克，解釋心靈問題本身就是個邏輯上的矛盾，這種不完全性（心靈解釋自己的無能）是哥德爾不完備定理的一個例子。哈耶克不是自然主義不可知論者，即那些認爲科學目前不能提供身心問題解釋的人。哈耶克認爲，徹底上，這個問題就是解不開。^[5]

約翰·廷德爾：見John Tyndall (1871)，Fragments of Science。

諾姆·喬姆斯基：諾姆·喬姆斯基認爲，所有認知能力都在生物學上被限制。^[6]見Noam Chomsky，Language and problems of knowledge。

現象和本體

伊曼努爾·康德在《純粹理性批判》中，認爲人類的思想不可避免地受到範疇的限制。

量的範疇 – 單一、多數、全體

質的範疇 – 實在、否定、限制
關係的範疇 – 依存性和自存性（實性和偶性）、因果性和獨立性、協同性

模態的範疇 – 可能性（英語：Logical possibility）或不可能性、存在或不存在、必然或偶然。

這些限制了人類的思維。可以瞭解的是現象，範疇之外不可瞭解的是本體，即物自體。

新神秘主義

變成蝙蝠會怎樣？湯瑪斯·內格爾這樣發問。他提到了對於經驗的主觀性（英語：subjective character of experience）認知封閉的可能性，以及其對於唯物主義、還原論、科學的意義。歐文·弗拉納根（英語：Owen Flanagan）在1991年的著作《心靈的科學》（Science of the Mind）中提到，一些當代思想家認爲意識永遠不會得到解釋。弗拉納根把他們叫做「新神秘主義者」，根據的是樂隊Question Mark and the Mysterians（英語：Question Mark and the Mysterians）的名字^[7]根據麥金，心物問題的正確答案不能被理解，深深地寫在我們的基因裏面。

顯現唯物論是個類似但不同的理論，認爲人類還不夠聰明以決定「心靈與物質的關係」。^{[來源請求]}^[可疑]

批判

儘管意識的本性是複雜的，但是根據一些哲學家，這並不意味着認知的封閉性，因此，麥金的論證是錯誤的。^[8]^[9]^[10]

參見

參考資料

^ Leslie Marsh (ed.), Hayek in Mind: Hayek's Philosophical Psychology, Emerald Group Publishing, 2011, p. xv.
^ Harris, Errol E, Reflections on the Problem of Consciousness: 51, 2006, McGinn's stance, while he denies the possibility of ever understanding the causal connection, may be regarded as "naturalistic" in the sense that he does not reject the validity of neuro-physiological theory, and does not doubt that brain activity accompanies conscious states. .
^ Ross Wilson (ed.), The Meaning of "Life" in Romantic Poetry and Poetics, Routledge, 2009, p. 88: "[McGinn] calls his stance "transcendental naturalism..."
^ McGinn, Colin. The Problem of Philosophy. Philosophical Studies. 1994, 76 (2–3): 133–56 [2020-02-25]. doi:10.1007/bf00989821. （原始內容存檔於2019-12-10）. it combines deep epistemic transcendence with the denial that what thus transcends is thereby non-natural.
^ Butos, W.N. The Social Science of Hayek's The Sensory Order. Advances in [[奧地利經濟學派|]]. Emerald. 2010: 127–28 [2020-02-25]. ISBN 978-1-84950975-6. （原始內容存檔於2020-08-12）. 1. Explanation is delimited by the apparatus of classification (the mind)... 2. An apparatus of classification cannot explain anything more complex than itself... 3. Therefore, the mind cannot fully explain itself...
^ Chomsky, Noam, Language and problems of knowledge: 152, 1988 .
^ Flanagan, Owen. The Science of the Mind. 麻省理工學院出版社. 1991: 313. ISBN 978-0-262-56056-6.
^ Garvey, James. What Does McGinn Think We Cannot Know?. Analysis. July 1997, 57 (3): 196–201. doi:10.1111/1467-8284.00074. Nothing he says gets him the conclusion that we cannot solve the mind-body problem, given any of these interpretations of what is cognitively closed to us
^ Kirk, Robert. Why Shouldn't We Be Able to Solve the Mind-Body Problem?. Analysis. January 1991, 51 (1): 17–23. JSTOR 3328626. doi:10.2307/3328626. He recognizes that many will find this outrageous; and indeed I think that his reasoning is fundamentally flawed and his central thesis false. But it will be worth trying to discover what has gone wrong.
^ Kriegel, Uriah. The new mysterianism and the thesis of cognitive closure. Acta Analytica. December 2003, 18 (1–2): 177–191. doi:10.1007/s12136-003-1020-1. it is incoherent to suppose that we cannot understand what would count as a solution to a problem we can and do understand

[1] Leslie Marsh (ed.), Hayek in Mind: Hayek's Philosophical Psychology, Emerald Group Publishing, 2011, p. xv.

[2] Harris, Errol E, Reflections on the Problem of Consciousness: 51, 2006, McGinn's stance, while he denies the possibility of ever understanding the causal connection, may be regarded as "naturalistic" in the sense that he does not reject the validity of neuro-physiological theory, and does not doubt that brain activity accompanies conscious states. .

[3] Ross Wilson (ed.), The Meaning of "Life" in Romantic Poetry and Poetics, Routledge, 2009, p. 88: "[McGinn] calls his stance "transcendental naturalism..."

[McGinn1994-4] McGinn, Colin. The Problem of Philosophy. Philosophical Studies. 1994, 76 (2–3): 133–56 [2020-02-25]. doi:10.1007/bf00989821. （原始內容存檔於2019-12-10）. it combines deep epistemic transcendence with the denial that what thus transcends is thereby non-natural.

[Butos2010-5] Butos, W.N. The Social Science of Hayek's The Sensory Order. Advances in [[奧地利經濟學派|]]. Emerald. 2010: 127–28 [2020-02-25]. ISBN 978-1-84950975-6. （原始內容存檔於2020-08-12）. 1. Explanation is delimited by the apparatus of classification (the mind)... 2. An apparatus of classification cannot explain anything more complex than itself... 3. Therefore, the mind cannot fully explain itself...

[6] Chomsky, Noam, Language and problems of knowledge: 152, 1988 .

[7] Flanagan, Owen. The Science of the Mind. 麻省理工學院出版社. 1991: 313. ISBN 978-0-262-56056-6.

[8] Garvey, James. What Does McGinn Think We Cannot Know?. Analysis. July 1997, 57 (3): 196–201. doi:10.1111/1467-8284.00074. Nothing he says gets him the conclusion that we cannot solve the mind-body problem, given any of these interpretations of what is cognitively closed to us

[9] Kirk, Robert. Why Shouldn't We Be Able to Solve the Mind-Body Problem?. Analysis. January 1991, 51 (1): 17–23. JSTOR 3328626. doi:10.2307/3328626. He recognizes that many will find this outrageous; and indeed I think that his reasoning is fundamentally flawed and his central thesis false. But it will be worth trying to discover what has gone wrong.

[10] Kriegel, Uriah. The new mysterianism and the thesis of cognitive closure. Acta Analytica. December 2003, 18 (1–2): 177–191. doi:10.1007/s12136-003-1020-1. it is incoherent to suppose that we cannot understand what would count as a solution to a problem we can and do understand

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