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===当前翻译条目:轰炸新加坡

轰炸新加坡 (1944–1945)
太平洋战争, 第二次世界大战的一部分
一张上边设有起重机的矩形設施浮在平水面上的的照片。可以看到许多船只在建筑物前方。
1941年5月期间第九海军基地的干船坞在新加坡海军基地浮动。 这个干船坞是USAAF在1945年的突袭目标。
日期1944年11月5日 – 1945年5月24日
地点
新加坡 及其附近海域
结果 战术未定义
参战方
美国 美国
 英国
日本 大日本帝国
兵力
第20轟炸機軍團
第222英國皇家空軍
防空高射炮以及战斗机单位
伤亡与损失
9架轰炸机损毁 海军,油库以及船坞受损
至少4艘船只损毁,11艘船只受伤

  轰炸新加坡(1944–1945) 是一场由盟军空军部队在第二次世界大战期间发起的军事战争。在1944年11月至1945年3月间美國陸軍航空隊 (USAAF)利用长距轰炸机针对被日本占领的新加坡地区进行了11次进行空袭.尽管在附近海域已经进行了布雷,大多数突袭还是针对海军基地和修船厂.在美军轰炸机调离之后,直到1945年5月24日以前,新加坡附近的布雷任务一直由英國皇家空軍所承担.
  这次突袭效果好坏参半.尽管对新加坡重要的海军基地及商业港口进行重创,但对其他次要目标的突袭却并未成功;另外对于新加坡附近海域岛上的石油贮藏基地也并未奏效.布雷活动令日军在新加坡附近地区陷入瘫痪,并导致3艘军被损毁,近10艘军舰受损.但这次战役并不是决定性的.尽管如此,盟军的这次空袭依然成功的鼓舞了新加坡的普通民众,他们认为袭击标志着城市即将被解放.尽管其中一次对军事设施的轰炸使得大量被误杀,并造成数百人流离失所.但就整体情况而言,平民伤亡量并不算高.

背景

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In the decades after World War I, Britain expanded 新加坡海軍基地 at Sembawang on Singapore's north coast as part of plans to deter Japanese expansionism in the region (the Singapore strategy).[1] The resulting facility was among the most important in the British Empire and included the large King George VI Graving Dock and Admiralty IX Floating Dry Dock.[2][3] The Commonwealth forces allocated to Malaya and Singapore were swiftly defeated in the months after the outbreak of the Pacific War, however, and the island was surrendered to the Japanese on 15 February 1942.[4] Singapore was bombed by Japanese aircraft on a number of occasions during the Battle of Malaya and subsequent fighting on the island itself; these raids caused many civilian deaths.[5]

 
The ocean liner “RMS”号 in the King George VI Graving Dock during August 1940.

Singapore Naval Base suffered little damage during the fighting in 1941 and 1942, and became the most important facility of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) outside the Japanese home islands.[6] As was the case under British rule, many locally-recruited civilians worked in the base, though the Japanese Navy subjected them to harsh discipline which included physical beatings for minor mistakes as well as imprisonment or execution for theft and leaks of information.[7] The Japanese Second Fleet and Third Fleet were transferred from the central Pacific to Singapore and the nearby Lingga Islands between February and April 1944 to be closer to their sources of fuel oil. These two fleets comprised the main body of the IJN, and operated most of its remaining battleships and aircraft carriers.[8]

駐守新加坡的日軍防備能力不強。1945年初只有兩個師擁有機炮, some IJN anti-aircraft units, and a small number of fighter aircraft. Some of the anti-aircraft guns were crewed by Malay auxiliaries.[9][10] The effectiveness of what was already an inadequate air defence force was hindered by a lack of coordination between the Army and Navy, shortages of fire control equipment for the guns, and no fire-control radar or barrage balloons being available.[10] Defence against night raids was particularly weak as no night fighters were stationed near Singapore and coordination between the anti-aircraft guns and searchlight units was poor.[11]

In June 1944, the USAAF's XX Bomber Command began flying combat operations with B-29 Superfortress heavy bombers from air bases near Kharagpur in northeastern India.[12] Although the Command's primary role was to attack industrial targets in the Japanese home islands, approximately 50 percent of its missions were undertaken to support other Allied operations in the Pacific.[13] The XX Bomber Command reported to the USAAF's Twentieth Air Force, which was personally directed from Washington, DC, by the commander of the USAAF General Henry H. Arnold, rather than the Allied theatre commanders in India and China.[14] Major General Curtis LeMay assumed command of XX Bomber Command on 29 August after Arnold relieved its first commander.[15]

Following the Japanese defeat in the Battle of Leyte Gulf in late October 1944, the remnants of the IJN were concentrated into two groups of ships. One group returned to bases in the Inland Sea, while the other was stationed at the Lingga Islands.[16] On 27 October, Arnold suggested to LeMay that the Japanese defeat at Leyte may have increased the importance of Singapore's naval facilities and asked whether XX Bomber Command could attack targets on the island. Little recent intelligence on Singapore was available, and on 30 October a photo-reconnaissance B-29 overflew Singapore for the first time and took good photos of the island. Despite this success, LeMay's staff believed that a daylight attack on Singapore—which required a 4,000 mi(6,400 km) round trip from Kharagpur—could not be successful. Regardless, Arnold ordered that XX Bomber Command attack Singapore.[6]

突袭

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Locations of B-29 bomber bases in India and Ceylon and the main targets they attacked in Southeast Asia

初始攻击

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对新加坡的第一次突袭发生在 1944 年 11 月 5 日。XX 轰炸机司令部从卡拉格普尔周围的基地派出了 76 架 B-29。由于距离目标很远,这架飞机每架仅配备两枚 1,000 磅炸弹;飞行员还被指示从低于正常高度的高度进行轰炸20,000英尺(6,100米),并保持松散的阵型。突袭的主要目标是乔治六世国王墓地码头,北部 苏门答腊的庞卡南布郎丹(Pangkalanbrandan)炼油厂被指定为次要目标。[6]

第一架 B-29 于 06:44 抵达新加坡海军基地。轰炸非常准确,先头飞机将炸弹置于墓地码头 caisson 大门的 50英尺(15米) 内。第三架 B-29 的炸弹落在附近,其他飞机也直接击中了坟场,使其无法使用三个月。降落在乔治六世国王墓地码头及其附近的炸弹还损坏了当时正在码头修理的 465英尺(142米) 货轮。码头内外的许多文职人员无法逃脱并被杀害。袭击者还对海军基地的其他设施造成了破坏。总体而言,53 座超级堡垒轰炸了新加坡海军基地,而 7 座袭击了 庞卡南布郎丹(Pangkalanbrandan)炼油厂。很少有日本高射炮或飞机向袭击者开火,但有两架 B-29 在事故中丢失。[6][17] 这次袭击是迄今为止进行的最长的白天轰炸行动。[18] Following the attack, Japanese soldiers murdered a group of injured Indonesian workers.[17] 乔治六世国王墓地码头的损坏意味着它无法用于修复在莱特湾海战中受损的日本战列舰。[19]

Later bombing raids

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直到 1945 年 1 月才对新加坡进行下一次突袭。据报道,在 菲律宾战役 中受损的日本军舰正在新加坡进行维修,一支由 47 艘超级堡垒组成的部队从印度派出攻击海军部IX浮动码头以及该岛南海岸的国王码头。这些飞机于 1 月 10 日午夜左右起飞,并于 1 月 11 日 08:20 开始抵达新加坡上空。只有 27 名袭击者袭击了码头,由于 柔佛海峡 日本军舰的猛烈防空火力,轰炸机没有造成任何损害。剩余的飞机轰炸了马来亚的 Penang、缅甸的 Mergui 和几个机会目标,但一般都没有成功。在这次行动中,两架 B-29 丢失。[11][20][21]

In January 1945, XX Bomber Command began preparations to redeploy to the Mariana Islands. The Command ceased its attacks on Japan and East Asia, for which it used bases in China to refuel the B-29s en route to their targets, and instead focused on targets in Southeast Asia that could be reached from Kharagpur. As there were few industrial targets within range of Kharagpur, the highest priority was given to attacking shipping in major ports such as Rangoon, Bangkok and Singapore as well as smaller harbours. Attacks were conducted through both conventional bombing and laying naval mines. As part of the transition, LeMay departed for the Mariana Islands on 18 January and was replaced by Brigadier General Roger M. Ramsey.[22]

XX Bomber Command conducted a major conventional bombing raid on Singapore Naval Base on 1 February. On that day, 112 B-29s were dispatched, each armed with four 1,000磅(450公斤) bombs. The raid's primary target, the Admiralty IX Floating Dock, was bombed by 67 of the 88 aircraft that reached Singapore. This attack sank the dry dock and destroyed the 460英尺(140米) ship berthed inside it. The other 21 aircraft that attacked Singapore bombed the West Wall area of the naval base and destroyed many buildings and some heavy equipment; this area housed the base's main offices. Of the remaining aircraft, 20 diverted and attacked targets in Penang and Martaban. A Japanese fighter shot down one of the B-29s and another Superfortress was destroyed on landing after suffering damage from air attack.[23][24]

 
Primary targets of the USAAF raids on Singapore.
(Note: This map depicts Singapore's modern coastline, not the World War II-era coastline.)

Although XX Bomber Command began preparations to attack on Singapore Naval Base again on 6 February, this raid was cancelled on the third of the month by Admiral Louis Mountbatten, the commander of Allied forces in the Southeast Asian theatre. Mountbatten ordered that the naval installations at Singapore and Penang not be targeted as they would be needed by Allied forces following the projected liberation of Malaya and Singapore later in 1945.[23][25] After requesting clarification of this order, Ramsey met with Mountbatten at Kandy. In this meeting Mountbatten assigned targets in the Kuala Lumpur area as XX Bomber Command's first priority, while second priority was given to carefully selected areas of Singapore. These areas excluded the King George VI Graving Dock and several other docks and areas with heavy machinery, but allowed attacks on the West Wall area of Singapore Naval Base, naval oil stores and commercial dock facilities. Saigon was assigned as XX Bomber Command's third priority and fourth priority was given to oil storage dumps on islands near Singapore.[26]

The next bombing raid on Singapore took place on 24 February. On that day, 116 B-29s were dispatched to bomb the Empire Dock area at Singapore's southern tip. This was a commercial dock, and was considered by XX Bomber Command planners to be "the only suitable primary target free of stipulations left in this theatre". The bombers were armed with incendiary bombs, and the 105 B-29s which reached Singapore succeeded in burning out 39 percent of the warehouse area near the dock.[27] As a result of the target being obscured by smoke, 26 of the B-29s used blind rather than visual bombing, resulting in poor accuracy and damage to civilian residential and commercial areas near the dock area. The Syonan Shimbun newspaper subsequently reported that 396 people had been made homeless by the raid.[28] USAAF losses from the raid were limited to a single B-29 which crashed after running out of fuel on its way back to India.[29]

 
The oil tanks at Samboe Island (pictured in 1936) were one of the targets attacked on 12 March 1945

XX Bomber Command attacked Singapore again on 2 March. As many of the Command's service units were en route to the Marianas, only 64 B-29s could be dispatched. These aircraft targeted the shop and warehouse area in Singapore Naval Base with 500磅(230公斤) bombs. The 49 B-29s which reached Singapore bombed this area and added to the damage caused by earlier raids, but the results of the attack were again limited by anti-aircraft fire from Japanese warships. Two B-29s were shot down by anti-aircraft guns during the raid.[11][30]

The final two raids conducted by XX Bomber Command before it deployed to the Marianas targeted oil storage facilities on islands in the Singapore area. On 12 March, three B-29 groups were dispatched to attack Bukom and Sebarok islands just off the south coast of Singapore as well as Samboe Island, which is a few miles south near Batam Island in the Dutch East Indies. Each of the groups was assigned a different island and no Japanese anti-aircraft guns or fighters were encountered. Despite this, poor weather meant that the 44 B-29s which reached the target area had to use blind bombing techniques and their attacks caused little damage. The command's final attack before it departed for the Marianas took place on the night of 29/30 March when 29 Superfortresses were sent to attack Bukom Island. In order to train the aircrew for the low-level tactics which were being used against the Japanese home islands, the bombers attacked their targets individually from altitudes between 5,000英尺(1,500米) and 7,000英尺(2,100米). This raid succeeded in destroying seven of the 49 oil tanks in the island, and a further three were damaged. No B-29s were lost in either raid.[11][30]

Minelaying near Singapore

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As part of its campaign against shipping, around each full moon from late January 1945 XX Bomber Command conducted minelaying missions. On the night of 25/26 January, 41 B-29s from the 444th and 468th Bombardment Groups laid six minefields in the approaches to Singapore.[31] On the same night other B-29s laid mines off Saigon and Cam Ranh Bay as part of the largest aerial minelaying effort in the Pacific up to that time.[32] On the night of 27/28 February, twelve B-29s were dispatched to lay mines in the Straits of Johor near Singapore. Ten of these aircraft successfully deployed 55 mines in the target area, and another aircraft mined Penang. During the next full moon period on the night of 28/29 March, 22 B-29s laid mines near Singapore. No aircraft were lost during these missions.[33]

Following the withdrawal of XX Bomber Command, the British Royal Air Force's No. 222 Group assumed responsibility for minelaying operations in the Singapore area using B-24 Liberator bombers.[34][35] Minelaying ceased on 24 May so that unswept mines did not interfere with the planned British-led landings in Malaya which were scheduled for September.[36] The Japanese established observation posts on islands in the Singapore Strait to spot minefields, but these were not effective and generally the fields were not detected until a ship struck a mine. In total, air-dropped mines sank three ships near Singapore and damaged another ten. Moreover, the minefields disrupted Japanese convoy routes and efforts to repair ships.[37] The Allied minelaying campaign was, however, too brief to achieve decisive results.[33]

Aftermath

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A Royal Air Force motor transport driver surveys damage caused by Allied bombing at Singapore docks, September 1945.

XX Bomber Command's attacks on Singapore produced mixed results. The raids on Singapore Naval Base damaged or destroyed many workshops and denied the Japanese the use of the King George VI Graving Dock between late 1944 and early 1945, and the Admiralty IX Dry Dock from February 1945. In addition, workers at the Naval Base did not return to work for some time after each raid, and had to be provided with better pay and rations and additional air-raid shelters. Although the damage inflicted on the Empire Docks area impeded Japanese port operations, the poor condition of the port area also hindered British efforts to rehabilitate Singapore following the war. The attacks on the oil storage tanks on islands near Singapore were less successful, and many were found to still be operable after the Japanese surrender.[38]

The Japanese military's efforts to defend Singapore from air attack were unsuccessful. Due to the weak state of the island's air defences, only nine B-29s were shot down during the American campaign, all of them during daylight raids.[39] Minesweeping operations were also slow, and it took three weeks to declare the port safe after each Allied minelaying raid.[37] The surviving crew members of the American bombers that were shot down met varying fates; a small number linked up with resistance movements such as the Malayan Peoples' Anti-Japanese Army, while others were captured by the Japanese and held in harsh conditions. Those who were captured by the IJN and held at the Naval Base were beheaded. After the war, Japanese personnel responsible for atrocities against these prisoners were hanged or given long prison terms during the Seletar War Crimes Trials.[10]

The air raids on Singapore raised the morale of the island's civilian population. They were seen as heralding Singapore's liberation from Japan's oppressive rule, though civilians were generally careful to hide this belief from Japanese occupation personnel.[40] The B-29s were widely seen as invulnerable, and civilians were cheered by their apparent ability to attack the Japanese at will. To counter this view, the occupation authorities exhibited wreckage from downed B-29s and surviving crew members, as well as film footage of a Superfortress being shot down, but without success. The Japanese also failed in their attempts to rouse Singapore's Muslim population against the raids by highlighting damage done to a mosque on 11 January and 24 February, the latter a raid which coincided with the celebration of Muhammad's birthday.[41] Another factor which contributed to public support for the raids was that the policy of targeting military installations meant that only a limited number of civilians became casualties, and the American bombing came to be seen as highly accurate.[42] The expectation of further attacks caused the prices of food and other commodities to rise, however, as people stockpiled necessities; Japanese attempts to stop this hoarding and profiteering were not successful.[43]

参考资料

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  1. ^ Toh (2009), pp. 908–909
  2. ^ Bayly and Harper (2004), p. 106
  3. ^ Hack and Blackburn (2004), pp. 22–23
  4. ^ Toh (2009), p. 909
  5. ^ Bayly and Harper (2004), pp. 117, 136–137, 139
  6. ^ 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3 Cate (1953), p. 156
  7. ^ Liew (2006), p. 429.
  8. ^ Royal Navy (1995a), pp. 85–87
  9. ^ Frei (2008), p. 220
  10. ^ 10.0 10.1 10.2 Toh (2009), p. 915
  11. ^ 11.0 11.1 11.2 11.3 Toh (2009), p. 914
  12. ^ Polmar (2004), p. 6
  13. ^ Wolk (2010), pp. 97–98
  14. ^ Wolk (2010), pp. 99–100
  15. ^ Cate (1953), pp. 103, 115
  16. ^ Dull (2007), pp. 313, 315
  17. ^ 17.0 17.1 Toh (2009), p. 917
  18. ^ Toh (2009), pp. 905–906
  19. ^ Royal Navy (1995c), p. 127
  20. ^ Cate (1953), p. 157
  21. ^ Huff (1997), pp. 245–246
  22. ^ Cate (1953), pp. 157–158
  23. ^ 23.0 23.1 Cate (1953), p. 160
  24. ^ Middlebrook and Mahoney (1979), p. 58
  25. ^ Kirby (1965), p. 405
  26. ^ Cate (1953), pp. 160–161
  27. ^ Cate (1953), pp. 162–163
  28. ^ Toh (2009), pp. 921–923
  29. ^ Cate (1953), p. 162
  30. ^ 30.0 30.1 Cate (1953), p. 163
  31. ^ Cate (1953), p. 158
  32. ^ Chilstrom (1993), p. 14
  33. ^ 33.0 33.1 Cate (1953), p. 159
  34. ^ Kirby (1965), p. 214
  35. ^ Royal Navy (1995b), pp. 45–46
  36. ^ Park (1946), p. 2148
  37. ^ 37.0 37.1 Royal Navy (1995b), p. 56
  38. ^ Toh (2009), pp. 912–913
  39. ^ Toh (2009), pp. 913–914
  40. ^ Toh (2009), p. 910
  41. ^ Toh (2009), pp. 919–920
  42. ^ Toh (2009), pp. 920–921, 923
  43. ^ Toh (2009), p. 918

Bibliography

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拓展阅读

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