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凡爾登戰役
第一次世界大戰西方戰線的一部分
戰役態勢圖
日期 1916年2月21日-12月18日 (9個月3周又6天) 地點 法國凡爾登防區 49°12′29″N 5°25′19″E 結果 法國勝利
參戰方
德國	法國
指揮官與領導者
埃里希·馮·法金漢 威廉皇儲 馮·克諾貝爾斯多夫 埃瓦爾德·洛克豪 馬克斯·加爾維茨 格奧爾格·德馬維茲	約瑟夫·霞飛 愛德華·卡斯泰爾諾 菲利普·貝當 羅貝爾·尼維爾 阿道夫·吉約馬 夏勒·芒然
兵力
50個師	75個師 (輪換制)
傷亡與損失
336,000–355,000人 143,000人死亡	379,000–400,000人 163,000人死亡 216,000人受傷
凡爾登 凡爾登，位於法國東北部大東部大區默茲省

凡爾登戰役（法語：Bataille de Verdun；德語：Schlacht um Verdun）是一場第一次世界大戰西方戰線於法國東北部凡爾登防區爆發的戰鬥，由法國第二軍團與德國第五軍團交戰，此役是一戰中持續最久的戰役，也是軍事史迄今傷亡人數最多的戰役之一。

1916年2月21日，德軍發動「審判行動」（德語：Unternehmen Gericht），執行德軍總參謀長埃里希·馮·法金漢策劃的消耗戰戰略。目標是佔領凡爾登防區（Région Fortifiée de Verdun）中易守難攻的默茲高地，欲使法軍派出部隊重奪該地，在己方損失不高的情況下使法軍「流血至死」。2月底，德軍已攻佔杜奧蒙要塞，兵臨默茲高地下方，但未能在法軍大部隊抵達前攻佔高地。3月，德軍重新集結部隊轉攻默茲河西岸，法軍砲兵部隊則不斷打擊德軍進攻部隊。之後，法軍試圖重奪杜奧蒙要塞，德軍也欲擴大戰果，但除了佔領沃要塞外無顯著戰果。7月1日，北方的英法部隊在索姆河流域發動進攻，開闢了第二戰場。7月12日，德軍總參謀長法金漢在最後一次大型進攻失利後，下令第五軍團轉入守勢，其本人在8月29日被解職。10月下旬，法軍發動戰略反攻，奪回杜奧蒙要塞、沃要塞與東岸的大片土地，象徵法軍贏得了凡爾登戰役。

背景

戰略形勢

1914年9月，德軍西線右翼主力部隊在第一次馬恩河戰役被法軍阻擊，雙方接著展開一系列的運動戰，從法國東北部延續到英吉利海峽，並在伊珀爾戰役後陷入僵持的塹壕戰。之後，協約國對德軍陣地發動多次進攻，但未能打破戰略僵持。德軍總參謀長埃里希·馮·法金漢在此背景中認為，德軍雖很難取得決定性勝利，但只要損害法軍的有生力量，德國仍能贏得戰爭。法金漢預計如果德軍進攻凡爾登，法軍將投入所有預備隊前去救援，同時英軍也會在法國北部發動輔助攻勢，此時德軍就能透過德軍砲兵對敵的顯著優勢，在兩個戰線都消耗敵軍力量。

Hints about Falkenhayn's thinking were picked up by Dutch military intelligence and passed on to the British in December. The German strategy was to create a favourable operational situation without a mass attack, which had been costly and ineffective when tried by the Franco-British, Falkenhayn intended to rely on the power of heavy artillery to inflict mass casualties. A limited offensive at Verdun would lead to the destruction of the French strategic reserve in fruitless counter-attacks and the defeat of British reserves during a hopeless relief offensive, leading to the French accepting a separate peace. If the French refused to negotiate, the second phase of the strategy would follow, in which the German armies would attack terminally weakened Franco-British armies, mop up the remains of the French armies and expel the British from Europe. To fulfil this strategy, Falkenhayn needed to hold back enough of the strategic reserve to defeat the Anglo-French relief offensives and then conduct a counter-offensive, which limited the number of divisions which could be sent to the 5th Army at Verdun for Unternehmen Gericht (Operation Judgement).

The Fortified Region of Verdun (RFV) lay in a salient formed during the German invasion of 1914. General Joseph Joffre, the Commander-in-Chief of the French Army, had concluded from the swift capture of the Belgian fortresses at the Battle of Liège and at the Siege of Namur in 1914 that fortifications had been made obsolete by German super-heavy siege artillery. In a directive of the General Staff of 5 August 1915, the RFV was to be stripped of 54 artillery batteries and 128,000 rounds of ammunition. Plans to demolish forts Douaumont and Vaux to deny them to the Germans were made and 11,000磅（5,000公斤） of explosives had been placed in Douaumont by the time of the German offensive on 21 February. The 18 large forts and other batteries around Verdun were left with fewer than 300 guns and a small reserve of ammunition, while their garrisons had been reduced to small maintenance crews. The railway line from the south into Verdun had been cut during the Battle of Flirey in 1914, with the loss of Saint-Mihiel; the line west from Verdun to Paris was cut at Aubréville in mid-July 1915 by the German 3rd Army, which had attacked southwards through the Argonne Forest since the new year.

凡爾登防區

凡爾登戰場地圖

For centuries, Verdun, on the Meuse river, had played an important role in the defence of the French hinterland. Attila the Hun failed to seize the town in the fifth century and when the empire of Charlemagne was divided under the Treaty of Verdun (843), the town became part of the Holy Roman Empire; the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 awarded Verdun to France. At the heart of the city was a citadel built by Vauban in the 17th century. A double ring of 28 forts and smaller works (ouvrages) had been built around Verdun on commanding ground, at least 490英尺（150米） above the river valley, 1.6—5.0 mi（2.5—8 km） from the citadel. A programme had been devised by Séré de Rivières in the 1870s to build two lines of fortresses from Belfort to Épinal and from Verdun to Toul as defensive screens and to enclose towns intended to be the bases for counter-attacks. Many of the Verdun forts had been modernised and made more resistant to artillery, with a reconstruction programme begun at Douaumont in the 1880s. A sand cushion and thick, steel-reinforced concrete tops up to 8英尺2英寸（2.5米） thick, buried under 3英尺3英寸—13英尺1英寸（1—4米） of earth, were added. The forts and ouvrages were sited to overlook each other for mutual support and the outer ring had a circumference of 28 mi（45 km）. The outer forts had 79 guns in shellproof turrets and more than 200 light guns and machine-guns to protect the ditches around the forts. Six forts had 155 mm guns in retractable turrets and fourteen had retractable twin 75 mm turrets.

裝載在列車上的SK L/45 38釐米艦砲（綽號長馬克斯）

In 1903, Douaumont was equipped with a new concrete bunker (Casemate de Bourges), containing two 75 mm field guns to cover the south-western approach and the defensive works along the ridge to Ouvrage de Froideterre. More guns were added from 1903 to 1913 in four retractable steel turrets. The guns could rotate for all-round defence and two smaller versions, at the north-eastern and north-western corners of the fort, housed twin Hotchkiss machine-guns. On the east side of the fort, an armoured turret with a 155 mm short-barrelled gun faced north and north-east and another housed twin 75 mm guns at the north end, to cover the intervals between the neighbouring forts. The fort at Douaumont formed part of a complex of the village, fort, six ouvrages, five shelters, six concrete batteries, an underground infantry shelter, two ammunition depots and several concrete infantry trenches. The Verdun forts had a network of concrete infantry shelters, armoured observation posts, batteries, concrete trenches, command posts and underground shelters between the forts. The artillery comprised 約 1,000 guns, with 250 in reserve; the forts and ouvrages were linked by telephone and telegraph, a narrow-gauge railway system and a road network; on mobilisation, the RFV had a garrison of 66,000 men and rations for six months.

前奏

德軍準備

凡爾登市與郊區的地圖

Verdun had been isolated on three sides since 1914 and the mainline Paris–St Menehould–Les Islettes–Clermont-en-Argonne–Aubréville–Verdun railway in the Forest of Argonne was closed in mid-July 1915, by the right flank divisions of the 5th Army (Generalmajor Crown Prince Wilhelm) when it reached the La Morte Fille–Hill 285 ridge, after continuous local attacks, rendering the railway unusable. Only a light railway remained to the French to carry bulk supplies; German-controlled mainline railways lay only 15 mi（24 km） to the north of the front line. A corps was moved to the 5th Army to provide labour for the preparation of the offensive. Areas were emptied of French civilians and buildings requisitioned. Thousands of kilometres of telephone cable were laid, a huge amount of ammunition and rations was dumped under cover and hundreds of guns were emplaced and camouflaged. Ten new rail lines with twenty stations were built and vast underground shelters (Stollen) 15—46英尺（4.5—14米） deep were dug, each to accommodate up to 1,200 infantry.

The III Corps, VII Reserve Corps and XVIII Corps were transferred to the 5th Army, each corps being reinforced by 2,400 experienced troops and 2,000 trained recruits. V Corps was placed behind the front line, ready to advance if necessary when the assault divisions were moving up. XV Corps, with two divisions, was in 5th Army reserve, ready to advance and mop up as soon as the French defence collapsed. Special arrangements were made to maintain a high rate of artillery-fire during the offensive; 33+1⁄2 munitions trains per day were to deliver ammunition sufficient for 2,000,000 rounds to be fired in the first six days and another 2,000,000 shells in the next twelve. Five repair shops were built close to the front to reduce delays for maintenance and factories in Germany were made ready, rapidly to refurbish artillery needing more extensive repairs. A redeployment plan for the artillery was devised, to move field guns and mobile heavy artillery forward, under the covering fire of mortars and the super-heavy artillery. A total of 1,201 guns were massed on the Verdun front, two thirds of which were heavy- and super-heavy artillery, which was obtained by stripping modern German artillery from the rest of the Western Front and substituting for it older types and captured Russian and Belgian guns. The German artillery could fire into the Verdun salient from three directions yet remain dispersed around the edges.

德軍計劃

德國第五軍團預計分為數組作戰區域，第8預備軍將佔領「甲區」、第18軍將佔領「乙區」、第3軍將佔領「丙區」、第15軍將佔領「丁區」。德軍砲兵預計於2月12日上午開始轟擊，而「甲區」至「丙區」的德軍部隊則在當天下午5點開始推進。

Wherever possible, the French advanced trenches were to be occupied and the second position reconnoitred for the artillery to bombard on the second day. Great emphasis was placed on limiting German infantry casualties by sending them to follow up destructive bombardments by the artillery, which was to carry the burden of the offensive in a series of large "attacks with limited objectives", to maintain a relentless pressure on the French. The initial objectives were the Meuse Heights, on a line from Froide Terre to Fort Souville and Fort Tavannes, which would provide a secure defensive position from which to repel French counter-attacks. "Relentless pressure" was a term added by the 5th Army staff and created ambiguity about the purpose of the offensive. Falkenhayn wanted land to be captured from which artillery could dominate the battlefield and the 5th Army wanted a quick capture of Verdun. The confusion caused by the ambiguity was left to the corps headquarters to sort out.

Control of the artillery was centralised by an Order for the Activities of the Artillery and Mortars, which stipulated that the corps Generals of Foot Artillery were responsible for local target selection, while co-ordination of flanking fire by neighbouring corps and the fire of certain batteries, was reserved to the 5th Army headquarters. French fortifications were to be engaged by the heaviest howitzers and enfilade fire. The heavy artillery was to maintain long-range bombardment of French supply routes and assembly areas; counter-battery fire was reserved for specialist batteries firing gas shells. Co-operation between the artillery and infantry was stressed, with accuracy of the artillery being given priority over rate of fire. The opening bombardment was to build up slowly and Trommelfeuer (a rate of fire so rapid that the sound of shell-explosions merged into a rumble) would not begin until the last hour. As the infantry advanced, the artillery would increase the range of the bombardment to destroy the French second position. Artillery observers were to advance with the infantry and communicate with the guns by field telephones, flares and coloured balloons. When the offensive began, the French were to be bombarded continuously, with harassing fire being maintained at night.

法軍準備

1916年2月至3月的默茲河東岸

In 1915, 237 guns and 647 long ton（657 t） of ammunition in the forts of the RFV had been removed, leaving only the heavy guns in retractable turrets. The conversion of the RFV to a conventional linear defence, with trenches and barbed wire began but proceeded slowly, after resources were sent west from Verdun for the Second Battle of Champagne (25 September to 6 November 1915). In October 1915, building began on trench lines known as the first, second and third positions and in January 1916, an inspection by General Noël de Castelnau, Chief of Staff at French General Headquarters (GQG), reported that the new defences were satisfactory, except for small deficiencies in three areas. The fortress garrisons had been reduced to small maintenance crews and some of the forts had been readied for demolition. The maintenance garrisons were responsible to the central military bureaucracy in Paris and when the XXX Corps commander, Major-General Paul Chrétien, attempted to inspect Fort Douaumont in January 1916, he was refused entry.

Douaumont was the largest fort in the RFV and by February 1916, the only artillery left in the fort were the 75 mm and 155 mm turret guns and light guns covering the ditch. The fort was used as a barracks by 68 technicians under the command of Warrant Officer Chenot, the Gardien de Batterie. One of the rotating 6.1英寸（155 mm） turrets was partially manned and the other was left empty. The Hotchkiss machine-guns were stored in boxes and four 75 mm guns in the casemates had already been removed. The drawbridge had been jammed in the down position by a German shell and had not been repaired. The coffres (wall bunkers) with Hotchkiss revolver-cannons protecting the moats, were unmanned and over 5,000公斤（11,000磅；4.9 long ton） of explosives had been placed in the fort to demolish it. Colonel Émile Driant was stationed at Verdun and criticised Joffre for removing the artillery guns and infantry from fortresses around Verdun. Joffre did not listen but Colonel Driant received the support of the Minister for War Joseph Gallieni. The formidable Verdun defences were a shell and were now threatened by a German offensive; Driant was to be proved correct by events.

1916年的默茲河西岸

In late January 1916, French intelligence obtained an accurate assessment of German military capacity and intentions at Verdun but Joffre considered that an attack would be a diversion, because of the lack of an obvious strategic objective. By the time of the German offensive, Joffre expected a bigger attack elsewhere but finally yielded to political pressure and ordered the VII Corps to Verdun on 23 January, to hold the north face of the west bank. XXX Corps held the salient east of the Meuse to the north and north-east and II Corps held the eastern face of the Meuse Heights; Herr had 8+1⁄2 divisions in the front line, with 2+1⁄2 divisions in close reserve. Groupe d'armées du centre (GAC, General De Langle de Cary) had the I and XX corps with two divisions each in reserve, plus most of the 19th Division; Joffre had 25 divisions in the French strategic reserve. French artillery reinforcements had brought the total at Verdun to 388 field guns and 244 heavy guns, against 1,201 German guns, two thirds of which were heavy and super heavy, including 14英寸（360 mm） and 202 mortars, some being 16英寸（410 mm）. Eight specialist flame-thrower companies were also sent to the 5th Army.

洛林省內的瓦夫爾地區（以綠色標示）

Castelnau met De Langle de Cary on 25 February, who doubted the east bank could be held. Castelnau disagreed and ordered General Frédéric-Georges Herr the corps commander, to hold the right (east) bank of the Meuse at all costs. Herr sent a division from the west bank and ordered XXX Corps to hold a line from Bras to Douaumont, Vaux and Eix. Pétain took over command of the defence of the RFV at 11:00 p.m., with Colonel Maurice de Barescut as chief of staff and Colonel Bernard Serrigny as head of operations, only to hear that Fort Douaumont had fallen. Pétain ordered the remaining Verdun forts to be re-garrisoned. Four groups were established, under the command of Generals Adolphe Guillaumat, Balfourier and Denis Duchêne on the right bank and Georges de Bazelaire on the left bank. A "line of resistance" was established on the east bank from Souville to Thiaumont, around Fort Douaumont to Fort Vaux, Moulainville and along the ridge of the Woëvre. On the west bank, the line ran from Cumières to Mort Homme, Côte 304 and Avocourt. A "line of panic" was planned in secret as a final line of defence north of Verdun, through forts Belleville, St. Michel and Moulainville. I Corps and XX Corps arrived from 24 to 26 February, increasing the number of divisions in the RFV to 14+1⁄2. By 6 March, the arrival of the XIII, XXI, XIV and XXXIII corps had increased the total to 20+1⁄2 divisions.

戰鬥

第一階段：2月21日-3月1日

主條目：杜奧蒙要塞

2月21日–26日

戰役前的杜奧蒙要塞，由德軍航空兵攝

Unternehmen Gericht (Operation Judgement) was due to begin on 12 February but fog, heavy rain and high winds delayed the offensive until 7:15 a.m. on 21 February, when a 10-hour artillery bombardment by 808 guns began. The German artillery fired 約 1,000,000 shells along a front about 19 mi（30 km） long by 3.1 mi（5 km） wide. The main concentration of fire was on the right (east) bank of the Meuse river. Twenty-six super-heavy, long-range guns, up to 17英寸（420 mm）, fired on the forts and the city of Verdun; a rumble could be heard 99 mi（160 km） away.

The bombardment was paused at midday, as a ruse to prompt French survivors to reveal themselves, and German artillery-observation aircraft were able to fly over the battlefield unmolested by French aircraft. The III Corps, VII Corps and XVIII Corps attacked at 4:00 p.m.; the Germans used flamethrowers and stormtroopers followed closely with rifles slung, using hand grenades to kill the remaining defenders. This tactic had been developed by Captain Willy Rohr and Sturm-Bataillon Nr. 5 (Rohr), the battalion which conducted the attack. French survivors engaged the attackers, yet the Germans suffered only 約 600 casualties.

戰鬥後的杜奧蒙要塞

By 22 February German troops had advanced 3.1 mi（5 km） and captured Bois des Caures at the edge of the village of Flabas. Two French battalions had held the bois (wood) for two days but were forced back to Samogneux, Beaumont-en-Auge and Ornes. Driant was killed, fighting with the 56th and 59th Bataillons de chasseurs à pied and only 118 of the Chasseurs managed to escape. Poor communications meant that only then did the French High Command realise the seriousness of the attack. The Germans managed to take the village of Haumont but French forces repulsed a German attack on the village of Bois de l'Herbebois. On 23 February, a French counter-attack at Bois des Caures was defeated.

Fighting for Bois de l'Herbebois continued until the Germans outflanked the French defenders from Bois de Wavrille. The German attackers suffered many casualties during their attack on Bois de Fosses and the French held on to Samogneux. German attacks continued on 24 February and the French XXX Corps was forced out of the second line of defence; XX Corps (General Maurice Balfourier) arrived at the last minute and was rushed forward. That evening Castelnau advised Joffre that the Second Army, under General Pétain, should be sent to the RFV. The Germans had captured Beaumont-en-Verdunois, Bois des Fosses and Bois des Caurières and were moving up ravin Hassoule, which led to Fort Douaumont.

At 3:00 p.m. on 25 February, infantry of Brandenburg Regiment 24 advanced with the II and III battalions side-by-side, each formed into two waves composed of two companies each. A delay in the arrival of orders to the regiments on the flanks, led to the III Battalion advancing without support on that flank. The Germans rushed French positions in the woods and on Côte 347, with the support of machine-gun fire from the edge of Bois Hermitage. The German infantry took many prisoners as the French on Côte 347 were outflanked and withdrew to Douaumont village. The German infantry had reached their objectives in under twenty minutes and pursued the French, until fired on by a machine-gun in Douaumont church. Some German troops took cover in woods and a ravine which led to the fort, when German artillery began to bombard the area, the gunners having refused to believe claims sent by field telephone that the German infantry were within a few hundred metres of the fort. Several German parties were forced to advance to find cover from the German shelling and two parties independently made for the fort. The Germans did not know that the French garrison was made up of only a small maintenance crew led by a warrant officer, since most of the Verdun forts had been partly disarmed, after the demolition of Belgian forts in 1914, by the German super-heavy Krupp 420 mm mortars.

1916年2月21日－26日的凡爾登，該地位於默茲河東岸

The German party of 約 100 soldiers tried to signal to the artillery with flares but twilight and falling snow obscured them from view. Some of the party began to cut through the wire around the fort, while French machine-gun fire from Douaumont village ceased. The French had seen the German flares and took the Germans on the fort to be Zouaves retreating from Côte 378. The Germans were able to reach the north-east end of the fort before the French resumed firing. The German party found a way through the railings on top of the ditch and climbed down without being fired on, since the machine-gun bunkers (coffres de contrescarpe) at each corner of the ditch had been left unmanned. The German parties continued and found a way inside the fort through one of the unoccupied ditch bunkers and then reached the central Rue de Rempart.

After quietly moving inside, the Germans heard voices and persuaded a French prisoner, captured in an observation post, to lead them to the lower floor, where they found Warrant Officer Chenot and about 25 French troops, most of the skeleton garrison of the fort, and took them prisoner. On 26 February, the Germans had advanced 1.9 mi（3 km） on a 6.2 mi（10 km） front; French losses were 24,000 men and German losses were 約 25,000 men. A French counter-attack on Fort Douaumont failed and Pétain ordered that no more attempts were to be made; existing lines were to be consolidated and other forts were to be occupied, rearmed and supplied to withstand a siege if surrounded.

2月27日–29日

由於融雪導致的地面泥濘，德軍的進攻在2月27日幾乎沒有進展。法國援軍的抵達也增強了法軍陣地的防禦。一些德軍火炮變得無法使用，另一些則被困在泥濘中。德軍步兵開始受困於勞累和無預料的高傷亡，約有500名德軍士兵在杜奧蒙村附近的戰鬥陣亡。 2月29日，由於大雪和法國第33步兵團的防禦，德軍的進攻在杜奧蒙被阻遏。 德軍的延誤使法軍即時從巴勒迪克運送9萬名士兵和2.1萬公噸的彈藥至凡爾登。由於泥濘的阻礙，德軍砲兵僅能緩慢推進，而德軍步兵推進的距離已經超出己方火砲的有效射程。向南推進的德軍暴露在默茲河西岸的法軍砲兵的射程內，並受到比先前的戰鬥還更慘重的打擊。

第二階段：3月6日-4月15日

3月6日–11日

勒莫羅姆與304號山

法金漢在攻勢發起前預估西岸的法軍砲兵將會被德軍砲火壓制，但最終未能成真。其中德軍設立了一支特別砲兵部隊以反擊西岸法軍的砲兵，但未能減少德軍步兵的傷亡。第五軍團在2月下旬向法金漢要求更多援兵，但出於德軍在東岸順利的進攻，以及保留有生力量以發起另一波攻勢的考量，法金漢拒絕了他們的提議。德軍在2月27日的受阻使法金漢必須思考將叫停攻勢或繼續進攻。2月29日，第五軍團參謀長馮·克諾貝爾斯多夫從預備隊中挑選了兩個師，以佔領西岸的高地。由第10預備軍支援的第6預備軍計劃攻佔阿沃庫爾以南、304號山以北、勒莫羅姆、屈米耶爾森林和205號山一線，如果成功控制該線，法軍在西岸的砲兵即可被德軍摧毀。

The artillery of the two-corps assault group on the west bank was reinforced by 25 heavy artillery batteries, artillery command was centralised under one officer and arrangements were made for the artillery on the east bank to fire in support. The attack was planned by General Heinrich von Gossler in two parts, on Mort-Homme and Côte 265 on 6 March, followed by attacks on Avocourt and Côte 304 on 9 March. The German bombardment reduced the top of Côte 304 from a height of 997英尺（304米） to 980英尺（300米）; Mort-Homme sheltered batteries of French field guns, which hindered German progress towards Verdun on the right bank; the hills also provided commanding views of the left bank. After storming the Bois des Corbeaux and then losing it to a French counter-attack, the Germans launched another assault on Mort-Homme on 9 March, from the direction of Béthincourt to the north-west. Bois des Corbeaux was captured again at great cost in casualties, before the Germans took parts of Mort-Homme, Côte 304, Cumières and Chattancourt on 14 March.

3月11日-4月9日

1916年5月31日德軍在凡爾登的部署

After a week, the German attack had reached the first-day objectives, to find that French guns behind Côte de Marre and Bois Bourrus were still operational and inflicting many casualties among the Germans on the east bank. German artillery moved to Côte 265, was subjected to systematic artillery fire by the French, which left the Germans needing to implement the second part of the west bank offensive, to protect the gains of the first phase. German attacks changed from large operations on broad fronts, to narrow-front attacks with limited objectives.

On 14 March a German attack captured Côte 265 at the west end of Mort-Homme but the French 75th Infantry Brigade managed to hold Côte 295 at the east end. On 20 March, after a bombardment by 13,000 trench mortar rounds, the 11th Bavarian and 11th Reserve divisions attacked Bois d'Avocourt and Bois de Malancourt and reached their initial objectives easily. Gossler ordered a pause in the attack, to consolidate the captured ground and to prepare another big bombardment for the next day. On 22 March, two divisions attacked "Termite Hill" near Côte 304 but were met by a mass of artillery fire, which also fell on assembly points and the German lines of communication, ending the German advance.

The limited German success had been costly and French artillery inflicted more casualties as the German infantry tried to dig in. By 30 March, Gossler had captured Bois de Malancourt at a cost of 20,000 casualties and the Germans were still short of Côte 304. On 30 March, the XXII Reserve Corps arrived as reinforcements and General Max von Gallwitz took command of a new Attack Group West (Angriffsgruppe West). Malancourt village was captured on 31 March, Haucourt fell on 5 April and Béthincourt on 8 April. On the east bank, German attacks near Vaux reached Bois Caillette and the Vaux–Fleury railway but were then driven back by the French 5th Division. An attack was made on a wider front along both banks by the Germans at noon on 9 April, with five divisions on the left bank but this was repulsed except at Mort-Homme, where the French 42nd Division was forced back from the north-east face. On the right bank an attack on Côte-du-Poivre failed.

德軍步兵對勒莫羅姆的進攻

In March the German attacks had no advantage of surprise and faced a determined and well-supplied adversary in superior defensive positions. German artillery could still devastate French defensive positions but could not prevent French artillery fire from inflicting many casualties on German infantry and isolating them from their supplies. Massed artillery fire could enable German infantry to make small advances but massed French artillery fire could do the same for French infantry when they counter-attacked, which often repulsed the German infantry and subjected them to constant losses, even when captured ground was held. The German effort on the west bank also showed that capturing a vital point was not sufficient, because it would be found to be overlooked by another terrain feature, which had to be captured to ensure the defence of the original point, which made it impossible for the Germans to terminate their attacks, unless they were willing to retire to the original front line of February 1916.

By the end of March the offensive had cost the Germans 81,607 casualties and Falkenhayn began to think of ending the offensive, lest it become another costly and indecisive engagement similar to the First Battle of Ypres in late 1914. The 5th Army staff requested more reinforcements from Falkenhayn on 31 March with an optimistic report claiming that the French were close to exhaustion and incapable of a big offensive. The 5th Army command wanted to continue the east bank offensive until a line from Ouvrage de Thiaumont, to Fleury, Fort Souville and Fort de Tavannes had been reached, while on the west bank the French would be destroyed by their own counter-attacks. On 4 April, Falkenhayn replied that the French had retained a considerable reserve and that German resources were limited and not sufficient to replace continuously men and munitions. If the resumed offensive on the east bank failed to reach the Meuse Heights, Falkenhayn was willing to accept that the offensive had failed and end it.

第三階段：4月16日-7月1日

4月

《凡爾登，世界的血泵》
1916年的德軍宣傳獎章

The failure of German attacks in early April by Angriffsgruppe Ost, led Knobelsdorf to take soundings from the 5th Army corps commanders, who unanimously wanted to continue. The German infantry were exposed to continuous artillery fire from the flanks and rear; communications from the rear and reserve positions were equally vulnerable, which caused a constant drain of casualties. Defensive positions were difficult to build, because existing positions were on ground which had been swept clear by German bombardments early in the offensive, leaving German infantry with very little cover. General Berthold von Deimling, commander of XV Corps, also wrote that French heavy artillery and gas bombardments were undermining the morale of the German infantry, which made it necessary to keep going to reach safer defensive positions. Knobelsdorf reported these findings to Falkenhayn on 20 April, adding that if the Germans did not go forward, they must go back to the start line of 21 February.

Knobelsdorf rejected the policy of limited piecemeal attacks tried by Mudra as commander of Angriffsgruppe Ost and advocated a return to wide-front attacks with unlimited objectives, swiftly to reach the line from Ouvrage de Thiaumont to Fleury, Fort Souville and Fort de Tavannes. Falkenhayn was persuaded to agree to the change and by the end of April, 21 divisions, most of the OHL reserve, had been sent to Verdun and troops had also been transferred from the Eastern Front. The resort to large, unlimited attacks was costly for both sides but the German advance proceeded only slowly. Rather than causing devastating French casualties by heavy artillery with the infantry in secure defensive positions, which the French were compelled to attack, the Germans inflicted casualties by attacks which provoked French counter-attacks and assumed that the process inflicted five French casualties for two German losses.

In mid-March, Falkenhayn had reminded the 5th Army to use tactics intended to conserve infantry, after the corps commanders had been allowed discretion to choose between the cautious, "step by step" tactics desired by Falkenhayn and maximum efforts, intended to obtain quick results. On the third day of the offensive, the 6th Division of the III Corps (General Ewald von Lochow), had ordered that Herbebois be taken regardless of loss and the 5th Division had attacked Wavrille to the accompaniment of its band. Falkenhayn urged the 5th Army to use Stoßtruppen (storm units) composed of two infantry squads and one of engineers, armed with automatic weapons, hand grenades, trench mortars and flame-throwers, to advance in front of the main infantry body. The Stoßtruppen would conceal their advance by shrewd use of terrain and capture any blockhouses which remained after the artillery preparation. Strongpoints which could not be taken were to be by-passed and captured by follow-up troops. Falkenhayn ordered that the command of field and heavy artillery units was to be combined, with a commander at each corps headquarters. Common observers and communication systems would ensure that batteries in different places could bring targets under converging fire, which would be allotted systematically to support divisions.

法軍步兵從戰壕中出擊

In mid-April, Falkenhayn ordered that infantry should advance close to the barrage, to exploit the neutralising effect of the shellfire on surviving defenders, because fresh troops at Verdun had not been trained in these methods. Knobelsdorf persisted with attempts to maintain momentum, which was incompatible with casualty conservation by limited attacks, with pauses to consolidate and prepare. Mudra and other commanders who disagreed were sacked. Falkenhayn also intervened to change German defensive tactics, advocating a dispersed defence with the second line to be held as a main line of resistance and jumping-off point for counter-attacks. Machine-guns were to be set up with overlapping fields of fire and infantry given specific areas to defend. When French infantry attacked, they were to be isolated by Sperrfeuer (barrage-fire) on their former front line, to increase French infantry casualties. The changes desired by Falkenhayn had little effect, because the main cause of German casualties was artillery fire, just as it was for the French.

5月4日–22日

自5月10日起，德軍的攻勢開始僅限於局部進攻，要麼回應法軍在4月上中旬的各處反擊，或是奪取有戰術價值的目標。貝當將軍在5月被升職為中央集團軍司令（GAC），羅貝爾·尼維爾將軍則接管駐扎在凡爾登的第二軍團。5月4日至24日，德軍在西岸莫爾翁附近發動進攻。於4日奪下304號山的北坡，於5日和6日擊退法軍的反擊。位於304號山山頂的法軍守軍於5月7日被迫撤退，但由於法軍炮兵大量的轟炸，德軍步兵也無法奪下山脊線。當法軍開始對杜奧蒙要塞發起反攻之時，屈米耶爾和考雷特於5月24日淪陷。

5月22日–24日

1916年5月的勒莫羅姆前線

In May, General Nivelle, who had taken over the Second Army, ordered General Charles Mangin, commander of the 5th Division to plan a counter-attack on Fort Douaumont. The initial plan was for an attack on a 1.9 mi（3 km） front but several minor German attacks captured the Fausse-Côte and Couleuvre ravines on the south-east and west sides of the fort. A further attack took the ridge south of the ravin de Couleuvre, which gave the Germans better routes for counter-attacks and observation over the French lines to the south and south-west. Mangin proposed a preliminary attack to retake the area of the ravines, to obstruct the routes by which a German counter-attack on the fort could be made. More divisions were necessary but these were refused to preserve the troops needed for the forthcoming offensive on the Somme; Mangin was limited to one division for the attack with one in reserve. Nivelle reduced the attack to an assault on Morchée Trench, Bonnet-d'Evèque, Fontaine Trench, Fort Douaumont, a machine-gun turret and Hongrois Trench, which would require an advance of 1,600英尺（500米） on a 3,770英尺（1,150米） front.

1916年在凡爾登戰役中的法軍防空炮，由奧托克羅姆技術拍攝的彩色影像

III Corps was to command the attack by the 5th Division and the 71st Brigade, with support from three balloon companies for artillery observation and a fighter group. The main effort was to be conducted by two battalions of the 129th Infantry Regiment, each with a pioneer company and a machine-gun company attached. The 2nd Battalion was to attack from the south and the 1st Battalion was to move along the west side of the fort to the north end, taking Fontaine Trench and linking with the 6th Company. Two battalions of the 74th Infantry Regiment were to advance along the east and south-east sides of the fort and take a machine-gun turret on a ridge to the east. Flank support was arranged with neighbouring regiments and diversions were planned near Fort Vaux and the ravin de Dame. Preparations for the attack included the digging of 7.5 mi（12 km） of trenches and the building of large numbers of depots and stores but little progress was made due to a shortage of pioneers. French troops captured on 13 May, disclosed the plan to the Germans, who responded by subjecting the area to more artillery harassing fire, which also slowed French preparations.

The French preliminary bombardment by four 370 mm mortars and 300 heavy guns, began on 17 May and by 21 May, the French artillery commander claimed that the fort had been severely damaged. During the bombardment the German garrison in the fort experienced great strain, as French heavy shells smashed holes in the walls and concrete dust, exhaust fumes from an electricity generator and gas from disinterred corpses polluted the air. Water ran short but until 20 May, the fort remained operational, reports being passed back and reinforcements moving forward until the afternoon, when the Bourges Casemate was isolated and the wireless station in the north-western machine-gun turret burnt down.

Conditions for the German infantry in the vicinity were far worse and by 18 May, the French destructive bombardment had obliterated many defensive positions, the survivors sheltering in shell-holes and dips of the ground. Communication with the rear was severed and food and water ran out by the time of the French attack on 22 May. The troops of Infantry Regiment 52 in front of Fort Douaumont had been reduced to 37 men near Thiaumont Farm and German counter-barrages inflicted similar losses on French troops. On 22 May, French Nieuport fighters attacked eight observation balloons and shot down six for the loss of one Nieuport 16; other French aircraft attacked the 5th Army headquarters at Stenay. German artillery fire increased and twenty minutes before zero hour, a German bombardment began, which reduced the 129th Infantry Regiment companies to about 45 men each.

法軍火砲連被德軍部隊佔領（可能為第34步兵師）

The assault began at 11:50 a. m. on 22 May on a 0.62 mi（1 km） front. On the left flank the 36th Infantry Regiment attack quickly captured Morchée Trench and Bonnet-d'Evèque but suffered many casualties and the regiment could advance no further. The flank guard on the right was pinned down, except for one company which disappeared and in Bois Caillette, a battalion of the 74th Infantry Regiment was unable to leave its trenches; the other battalion managed to reach its objectives at an ammunition depot, shelter DV1 at the edge of Bois Caillette and the machine-gun turret east of the fort, where the battalion found its flanks unsupported.

Despite German small-arms fire, the 129th Infantry Regiment reached the fort in a few minutes and managed to get in through the west and south sides. By nightfall, about half of the fort had been recaptured and next day, the 34th Division was sent to reinforce the French troops in the fort. The attempt to reinforce the fort failed and German reserves managed to cut off the French troops inside and force them to surrender, 1,000 French prisoners being taken. After three days, the French had suffered 5,640 casualties from the 12,000 men in the attack and the Germans suffered 4,500 casualties in Infantry Regiment 52, Grenadier Regiment 12 and Leib-Grenadier Regiment 8 of the 5th Division.

5月30日-6月7日

主條目：攻佔沃要塞

拉紹姆要塞視角東北方的凡爾登戰場，1917年

1916年5月下旬，德軍的進攻從西岸的莫羅姆和304號山轉移至東岸杜奧蒙要塞的南方。德軍進攻至法軍的最後一道防線弗勒里山脊，這次進攻的目的是奪取法國防線東北部的蒂奧蒙要塞、弗勒里、蘇維耶要塞和沃要塞，這些地區自攻勢開始後每天被約8,000顆砲彈轟炸。10,000名德軍士兵在6月1日發起進攻，於6月2日佔領了沃要塞的頂端。戰鬥持續進行直到守軍將儲備的水耗盡，574名倖存者於6月7日投降，德軍則有多達2,742人傷亡或失蹤。 當沃要塞淪陷的消息傳到凡爾登時，市民和守軍緊急在城市邊界挖掘戰壕和防線。在西岸，德軍從304號山、莫羅姆和屈米耶爾一線向法軍控制的阿沃庫爾和沙唐庫爾進軍。大雨拖慢了德軍對蘇維耶要塞的進攻，該處將在接下來的兩個月不斷被雙方交替控制。

6月22日–25日

德國第五軍團從2月至6月佔領的凡爾登地區

6月22日，德軍砲兵向法軍砲兵陣地發射超過11.6萬發雙光氣化學武器，導致超過1,600人傷亡和大量火砲的暫時停火。 隔天清晨5點，德軍向五公里長的防線發動攻擊，並建立一個3乘2公里的突出部。攻勢進行得十分順利，直到上午9點時一些法軍部隊才得以進行後衛行動。在南方的蒂奧蒙要塞和富瓦德特爾要塞被德軍佔領，弗勒里和沙佩勒聖凡村被控制。攻勢發生於自4月以來遭到3.8萬顆砲彈襲擊的蘇維耶要塞附近，德軍此時距離凡爾登要塞僅剩下5公里。

1916年6月23日，尼維爾下令

Vous ne les laisserez pas passer, mes camarades（他們絕不能通過，我的戰友們。）

沙佩勒聖凡迅速重歸法軍的控制，德軍的進攻被迫停止。德軍步兵的供水補給陷入危機，突出部在三面受到打擊下變得脆弱，德軍在缺乏雙光氣補給的情況下無法繼續進攻，沙佩勒聖凡成為德軍在凡爾登戰役中到達的最遠處。6月24日英法聯軍開始對索姆河岸進行轟炸。 弗勒里自6月23日至8月17日被法德雙方交替控制了十六次，同時四個法國師從索姆河調至凡爾登。6月24日，法軍火砲恢復到足以切斷德軍前線與後方的聯繫。到了6月25日雙方陷入膠著，克諾貝爾斯多夫下令停止進攻。

第四階段：7月1日-12月17日

主條目：布魯西洛夫攻勢和索姆河戰役

5月結束時在凡爾登的法軍傷亡已達到18.5萬人，德軍傷亡則在6月達到20萬人。 法國和英國聯軍在索姆河戰役初期的突破以及布魯西洛夫攻勢對奧匈軍隊的打擊，使德軍將部分火砲從凡爾登轉移，法國獲得了戰略性的成功。

7月9日–15日

法軍步兵在砲火下進攻

蘇維耶要塞控制了弗勒里東南方1公里的山峰，是2月攻勢的原先計畫目標之一。佔領該要塞將使德軍德以俯視凡爾登。 德軍於7月9日開始進行預備砲擊，試圖利用超過6萬發毒氣砲彈壓製法軍的砲火，但由於法軍裝備改良的M2防毒面具效果微乎其微。 蘇維耶要塞和其周圍被超過30萬枚砲彈轟炸，包含直接打擊要塞的500枚360公釐炮彈。

7月11日，德軍三個師發起進攻，但德軍步兵擠在前往蘇維耶要塞的道路上並遭到法軍炮兵的砲擊，倖存的部隊則被佔據要塞上層的60名法軍士兵射擊。來自第140步兵團的30名士兵成功在7月12日抵達要塞頂，德軍士兵已經可以看到凡爾登市建築的屋頂和大教堂的尖塔。在由克萊貝爾·迪皮中尉領導的反擊後，入侵的德軍部隊皆投降或撤退。 7月11日，法金漢下令威廉皇儲將部隊轉入守勢。7月15日，法軍發動一次大型反擊但未能奪回領土。在此月的下半月，法軍僅發動一些小型攻勢。

8月1日-9月17日

8月一日，德軍對蘇維耶要塞發動900公尺的突擊，使法國發動長達兩週的反擊，奪回一些被佔據的領土。 8月18日，弗勒里被法軍收復。到了9月，法軍已經奪回於7月和8月損失的領土。 8月29日，保羅·馮·興登堡和第一軍需將軍埃里希·魯登道夫取代法金漢成為總參謀長。 9月3日，法軍對弗勒里兩翼的進攻使法軍防線推進數百公尺，德軍9月4日和5日的反擊以失敗告終。法軍在9月9日、13日和15日至17日持續進攻，除了在9月4日於塔瓦訥隧道因火災導致474名法軍士兵死亡以外，整體傷亡十分輕微。

10月20日–11月2日

第一次凡爾登攻勢，1916年10月24日–9月2日

1916年10月20日，法國發動第一次凡爾登攻勢（1ère Bataille Offensive de Verdun）以奪回杜奧蒙要塞，成功推進超過2公里。22個位於凡爾登的師有7個在10月中旬被替換，法軍步兵排重組為包含步槍手、擲彈兵和機槍手的混合部隊。在為期六天的初步砲擊中，700門法軍野戰砲與榴彈砲發射855,264枚砲彈，包含超過50萬枚75公釐野戰砲彈、10萬枚155枚中型砲彈和373枚370公釐與400公釐超級重砲彈。

位於西南方13公里的貝萊考的兩門法國聖沙蒙列車炮發射400公釐超重型砲彈，每枚重達0.91公噸。 法軍已經識別位於東岸的800門火砲所在，這些火砲足以支持德軍第34、第54、第9和第33預備步兵師，以及作為預備隊的第10與第5師。 至少有20枚法軍超重型砲彈擊中德軍控制的杜奧蒙要塞，其中六枚穿過屋頂並在倉庫中爆炸，引發火災並摧毀7,000枚手榴彈。

法軍步兵重奪杜奧蒙

芒然將軍指揮的法國第38、第133和第74師於10月24日上午11點40分發動攻擊。 法軍步兵在火砲彈幕和霧氣的掩護下衝出戰壕，並利用尼維爾將軍研發的徐進彈幕推進。 法軍在第38師指揮官阿瑟·德·薩蘭的率領下佔領杜奧蒙要塞，並推進至沃要塞附近。法軍在一系列的行動中損失輕微，成功俘虜超過6,000名敵軍和15門重砲。 10月25日對沃要塞的進攻失敗了，但法軍得以轉移他們的火炮至沃要塞附近，這將對下週的軍事行動產生積極影響。

歐迪奧蒙採石場、蒂奧蒙要塞、蒂奧蒙農場、杜奧蒙村、凱萊特森林、沃池塘、布瓦菲米東側和當盧炮台等一系列地區被收復。 法軍重砲於11月2日開始轟炸沃要塞，德軍在一次由220公釐炮彈引起的爆炸後撤出了要塞。法軍偶然竊聽到德軍宣布撤離的無線電電報，一個法軍步兵連在不開一槍的情況下成功進入要塞。11月5日，法軍推進至原先2月24日的戰線，並停止進攻行動直到12月中旬。

12月15日–17日

第二次凡爾登攻勢，1916年12月15–16日

第二次凡爾登攻勢（2ième Bataille Offensive de Verdun）由貝當和尼維爾制定，並由芒然執行。第126師、第38師、第37師和第133師在4個預備師和740門重砲的幫助下發動攻擊。 在6天內從827門火砲發射117萬枚砲彈後，法軍於12月15日上午10點發起攻擊。法軍最後的轟炸經過偵察機的引導落入戰壕、掩體和觀察哨。5個德軍師在533門火砲的支援下佔據防守位置，其中有3分之2的兵力部署在戰區，剩餘部分則作為預備隊。

其中2個德軍師人力不足，僅有約3,000名步兵，而非平常建立的7,000名步兵。法軍依靠著雙重的火砲彈幕掩護進攻，一波砲擊發射榴霰彈在距離法軍前線64公尺之處，另一波則發射爆裂彈在距離法軍前線140公尺之處，直接打擊德軍的第二條防線，切斷德軍的撤退路徑和阻止增援。德軍的防線陷入崩潰，5個德軍師中的13,500人死亡或被俘，大部分被困在掩體下並被法軍步兵俘虜。

法軍在糟糕的天氣下收復了於2月失去的瓦什羅維爾和盧沃蒙，以及奧道蒙和盧沃蒙-科特迪普瓦夫爾。德軍預備隊直到傍晚才抵達前線，2個奉命在傍晚前抵達的反擊師（Eingreif）到了晚上時仍在23公里外。到了12月16日的夜晚，法軍在德軍預備隊和反擊師得以進行反擊前，建立了一條位於於杜奧蒙要塞以北約2至3公里，從伯宗沃到科特迪普瓦夫爾的新戰線。杜奧蒙要塞中的155公釐重砲被修復以支援法軍的進攻。 距離凡爾登最近的德軍陣地已被驅至7.5公里外，所有的主要觀察點皆被奪回。法軍在第二次攻勢中俘虜11,387人和115門火砲。 一些德軍軍官向芒然抱怨囚室的舒適度，他向他們回覆：「紳士們，我們對此感到抱歉，沒想到會有這麼多人。」 第五軍團司令洛克豪和第十四預備兵團司令約翰·馮·茨維爾於12月16日被解職。

後果

分析

法金漢在他的回憶錄寫道，他在1915年12月向德皇表達對戰略局勢的看好

法國的弦已經達到臨界點。大規模突破（無論如何都超出我們的能力）是不必要的。我們在能力所及之內仍可保留部分力量，法國總參謀部則將被迫投入他們所有的人力。如果他們這麼做，法國將會流血至死。

——法金漢

The German strategy in 1916 was to inflict mass casualties on the French, a goal achieved against the Russians from 1914 to 1915, to weaken the French Army to the point of collapse. The French had to be drawn into circumstances from which the Army could not escape, for reasons of strategy and prestige. The Germans planned to use a large number of heavy and super-heavy guns to inflict a greater number of casualties than French artillery, which relied mostly upon the 75 mm field gun. In 2007, Robert Foley wrote that Falkenhayn intended a battle of attrition from the beginning, contrary to the views of Wolfgang Foerster in 1937, Gerd Krumeich in 1996 and others but the loss of documents led to many interpretations of the strategy. In 1916, critics of Falkenhayn claimed that the battle demonstrated that he was indecisive and unfit for command, echoed by Foerster in 1937. In 1994, Holger Afflerbach questioned the authenticity of the "Christmas Memorandum"; after studying the evidence that had survived in the Kriegsgeschichtliche Forschungsanstalt des Heeres (Army Military History Research Institute) files, he concluded that the memorandum had been written after the war but that it was an accurate reflection of Falkenhayn's thinking at the end of 1915.

法軍的補給馬匹在前往凡爾登的途中在河邊休息

Krumeich wrote that the Christmas Memorandum was fabricated to justify a failed strategy and that attrition had been substituted for the capture of Verdun only after the attack failed. Foley wrote that after the failure of the Ypres Offensive of 1914, Falkenhayn had returned to the pre-war strategic thinking of Moltke the Elder and Hans Delbrück on Ermattungsstrategie (attrition strategy), because the coalition fighting Germany was too powerful to be defeated decisively. Falkenhayn wanted to divide the Allies by forcing at least one of the Entente powers into a negotiated peace. An attempt at attrition lay behind the offensive in the east in 1915 but the Russians had refused to accept German peace feelers, despite the huge defeats inflicted on them by the Austro-Germans.

With insufficient forces to break through the Western Front and to overcome the reserves behind it, Falkenhayn tried to force the French to attack instead, by threatening a sensitive point close to the front line and chose Verdun. Huge losses were to be inflicted on the French by German artillery on the dominating heights around the city. The 5th Army would begin a big offensive but with the objectives limited to seizing the Meuse Heights on the east bank, on which the German heavy artillery would dominate the battlefield. The French Army would "bleed itself white" in hopeless attempts to recapture the heights. The British would be forced to launch a hasty relief offensive and suffer an equally costly defeat. If the French refused to negotiate, a German offensive would mop up the remnants of the Franco-British armies, breaking the Entente "once and for all".

In a revised instruction to the French Army in January 1916, the General Staff (GQG) wrote that equipment could not be fought by men. Firepower could conserve infantry but attrition prolonged the war and consumed troops that had been preserved in earlier battles. In 1915 and early 1916, German industry quintupled the output of heavy artillery and doubled the production of super-heavy artillery. French production had also recovered since 1914 and by February 1916 the army had 3,500 heavy guns. In May Joffre began to issue each division with two groups of 155 mm guns and each corps with four groups of long-range guns. Both sides at Verdun had the means to fire huge numbers of heavy shells to suppress the opposing defences before risking infantry in the open. At the end of May, the Germans had 1,730 heavy guns at Verdun and the French 548, sufficient to contain the Germans but not enough for a counter-offensive.

「凡爾登的保衛者」讓·納瓦拉的紐波特11戰鬥機

French infantry survived bombardment better because their positions were dispersed and tended to be on dominating ground, not always visible to the Germans. As soon as a German attack began, the French replied with machine-gun and rapid field-artillery fire. On 22 April, the Germans suffered 1,000 casualties and in mid-April, the French fired 26,000 field artillery shells against an attack to the south-east of Fort Douaumont. A few days after taking over at Verdun, Pétain ordered the air commander, Commandant Charles Tricornot de Rose to sweep away German fighter aircraft and to provide artillery observation. German air superiority was reversed by concentrating the French fighters in escadrilles rather than distributing them piecemeal across the front, unable to concentrate against large German formations. The fighter escadrilles drove away the German Fokker Eindeckers and the two-seater reconnaissance and artillery-observation aircraft that they protected.

The fighting at Verdun was less costly to both sides than the war of movement in 1914, when the French suffered 約 850,000 casualties and the Germans 約 670,000 from August to the end of 1914. The 5th Army had a lower rate of loss than armies on the Eastern Front in 1915 and the French had a lower average rate of loss at Verdun than the rate over three weeks during the Second Battle of Champagne (September–October 1915), which were not deliberately fought as battles of attrition. German loss rates increased relative to losses from 1:2.2 in early 1915 to close to 1:1 by the end of the battle, a trend which continued during the Nivelle Offensive in 1917. The penalty of attrition tactics was indecision, because limited-objective attacks under an umbrella of massed heavy artillery fire could succeed but led to battles of unlimited duration. Pétain used a noria‎ (rotation) system quickly to relieve French troops at Verdun, which involved most of the French Army in the battle but for shorter periods than the German troops in the 5th Army. The symbolic importance of Verdun proved a rallying point and the French did not collapse. Falkenhayn was forced to conduct the offensive for much longer and commit far more infantry than intended. By the end of April, most of the German strategic reserve was at Verdun, suffering similar casualties to the French army.

The Germans believed that they were inflicting losses at a rate of 5:2; German military intelligence thought that by 11 March the French had suffered 100,000 casualties and Falkenhayn was confident that German artillery could easily inflict another 100,000 losses. In May, Falkenhayn estimated that French casualties had increased to 525,000 men against 250,000 German and that the French strategic reserve was down to 300,000 men. Actual French losses were 約 130,000 by 1 May; 42 French divisions had been withdrawn and rested by the noria‎ system, once infantry casualties reached 50 percent. Of the 330 infantry battalions of the French metropolitan army, 259 (78 per cent) went to Verdun, against 48 German divisions, 25 percent of the Westheer (western army). Afflerbach wrote that 85 French divisions fought at Verdun and that from February to August, the ratio of German to French losses was 1:1.1, not the third of French losses assumed by Falkenhayn. By 31 August, the 5th Army had suffered 281,000 casualties and the French 315,000.

位於凡爾登的304號山的法軍戰壕

In June 1916, the French had 2,708 guns at Verdun, including 1,138 field guns; from February to December, the French and German armies fired 約10,000,000 shells, weighing 1,350,000 long ton（1,370,000 t）. By May, the German offensive had been defeated by French reinforcements, difficulties of terrain and the weather. The 5th Army infantry was stuck in tactically dangerous positions, overlooked by the French on both banks of the Meuse, instead of dug in on the Meuse Heights. French casualties were inflicted by constant infantry attacks which were far more costly in men than destroying counter-attacks with artillery. The stalemate was broken by the Brusilov Offensive and the Anglo-French relief offensive on the Somme, which Falkehayn had expected to begin the collapse of the Anglo-French armies. Falkenhayn had begun to remove divisions from the Western Front in June for the strategic reserve but only twelve divisions could be spared. Four divisions were sent to the Somme, where three defensive positions had been built, based on the experience of the Herbstschlacht. Before the battle on the Somme began, Falkenhayn thought that German preparations were better than ever and the British offensive would easily be defeated. The 6th Army, further north, had 17+1⁄2 divisions and plenty of heavy artillery, ready to attack once the British had been defeated.

The strength of the Anglo-French attack on the Somme surprised Falkenhayn and his staff, despite the British casualties on 1 July. Artillery losses to "overwhelming" Anglo-French counter-battery fire and the German tactic of instant counter-attacks, led to far more German infantry casualties than at the height of the fighting at Verdun, where the 5th Army suffered 25,989 casualties in the first ten days, against 40,187 2nd Army casualties on the Somme. The Russians attacked again, causing more casualties in June and July. Falkenhayn was called on to justify his strategy to the Kaiser on 8 July and again advocated the minimal reinforcement of the east in favour of the "decisive" battle in France; the Somme offensive was the "last throw of the dice" for the Entente. Falkenhayn had already given up the plan for a counter-offensive by the 6th Army and sent 18 divisions to the 2nd Army and to the Russian front from the reserve and from the 6th Army; only one division remaining uncommitted by the end of August. The 5th Army had been ordered to limit its attacks at Verdun in June but a final effort was made in July to capture Fort Souville. The attack failed and on 12 July Falkenhayn ordered a strict defensive policy, permitting only small local attacks to limit the number of troops the French could transfer to the Somme.

Falkenhayn had underestimated the French, for whom victory at all costs was the only way to justify the sacrifices already made; the French army never came close to collapsing and causing a premature British relief offensive. The ability of the German army to inflict disproportionate losses had also been overestimated, in part because the 5th Army commanders had tried to capture Verdun and attacked regardless of loss. Even when reconciled to the attrition strategy, they continued with Vernichtungsstrategie (strategy of annihilation) and the tactics of Bewegungskrieg (manoeuvre warfare). Failure to reach the Meuse Heights left the 5th Army in poor tactical positions and reduced to inflicting casualties by infantry attacks and counter-attacks. The length of the offensive made Verdun a matter of prestige for the Germans as it was for the French and Falkenhayn became dependent on a British relief offensive being destroyed to end the stalemate. When it came, the collapse in Russia and the power of the Anglo-French attack on the Somme reduced the German armies to holding their positions as best they could. On 29 August, Falkenhayn was sacked and replaced by Hindenburg and Ludendorff, who ended the German offensive at Verdun on 2 September.

傷亡

1919年發現的士兵遺骸

In 2013, Paul Jankowski wrote that since the beginning of the war, French army units had produced numerical loss states (états numériques des pertes) every five days for the Bureau of Personnel at GQG. The Health Service (Service de Santé) at the Ministry of War received daily counts of wounded taken in by hospitals and other services but casualty data was dispersed among regimental depots, GQG, the Registry Office (État Civil), which recorded deaths, the Service de Santé, which counted injuries and illnesses and Renseignements aux Familles (Family Liaison), which communicated with next of kin. Regimental depots were ordered to keep fiches de position (position sheets) to record losses continuously and the Première Bureau of GQG began to compare the five-day états numériques des pertes with the records of hospital admissions. The new system was used to calculate losses back to August 1914, which took several months; the system had become established by February 1916. The états numériques des pertes were used to calculate casualty figures published in the Journal Officiel, the French Official History and other publications.

The German armies compiled Verlustlisten (loss lists) every ten days, which were published by the Reichsarchiv in the deutsches Jahrbuch of 1924–1925. German medical units kept detailed records of medical treatment at the front and in hospital and in 1923 the Zentral Nachweiseamt (Central Information Office) published an amended edition of the lists produced during the war, incorporating medical service data not in the Verlustlisten. Monthly figures of wounded and ill servicemen that received medical treatment were published in 1934 in the Sanitätsbericht (Medical Report). Using such sources for comparison is difficult because the information recorded losses over time, rather than place. Losses calculated for a battle could be inconsistent, as in the Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire during the Great War 1914–1920 (1922). In the early 1920s, Louis Marin reported to the Chamber of Deputies but could not give figures per battle, except for some by using numerical reports from the armies, which were unreliable unless reconciled with the system established in 1916.

Some French data excluded those lightly wounded but some did not. In April 1917, GQG required that the états numériques des pertes discriminate between lightly wounded, treated locally for 20 to 30 days and severely wounded evacuated to hospitals. Uncertainty over the criteria had not been resolved before the war ended. Verlustlisten excluded lightly wounded and the Zentral Nachweiseamt records included them. Churchill revised German statistics by adding 2 per cent for unrecorded wounded in The World Crisis, written in the 1920s and James Edmonds, the British official historian, added 30 per cent. For the Battle of Verdun, the Sanitätsbericht contained incomplete data for the Verdun area, did not define "wounded" and the 5th Army field reports exclude them. The Marin Report and Service de Santé covered different periods but included lightly wounded. Churchill used a Reichsarchiv figure of 428,000 casualties and took a figure of 532,500 casualties from the Marin Report, for March to June and November to December 1916, for all the Western Front.

The états numériques des pertes give French casualties as 348,000 to 378,000 and in 1930, Hermann Wendt recorded French Second Army and German 5th Army casualties of 362,000 and 336,831 respectively from 21 February to 20 December, not taking account of the inclusion or exclusion of lightly wounded. In 2006, McRandle and Quirk used the Sanitätsbericht to increase the Verlustlisten by 約 11 per cent, which gave 373,882 casualties, compared to the French Official History record to 20 December 1916, of 373,231 French casualties. The Sanitätsbericht, which explicitly excluded lightly wounded, compared German losses at Verdun in 1916, averaging 37.7 casualties per thousand men, with the 9th Army in Poland 1914 which had a casualty average of 48.1 per 1,000, the 11th Army in Galicia 1915 averaging 52.4 per 1,000 men, the 1st Army on the Somme 1916 average of 54.7 per 1,000 and the 2nd Army average for the Somme 1916 of 39.1 per 1,000 men. Jankowski estimated an equivalent figure for the French Second Army of 40.9 men per 1,000 including lightly wounded. With a 約 11 per cent adjustment to the German figure of 37.7 per 1,000 to include lightly wounded, following the views of McRandle and Quirk; the loss rate is similar to the estimate for French casualties.

1927年的杜奧蒙墓地

In the second edition of The World Crisis (1938), Churchill wrote that the figure of 442,000 was for other ranks and the figure of "probably" 460,000 casualties included officers. Churchill gave a figure of 278,000 German casualties, 72,000 fatal and expressed dismay that French casualties had exceeded German by about 3:2. Churchill wrote that an eighth needed to be deducted from his figures to account for casualties on other sectors, giving 403,000 French and 244,000 German casualties. In 1980, John Terraine calculated 約 750,000 French and German casualties in 299 days; Dupuy and Dupuy (1993) 542,000 French casualties. In 2000, Hannes Heer and Klaus Naumann calculated 377,231 French and 337,000 German casualties, a monthly average of 70,000. In 2000, Holger Afflerbach used calculations made by Hermann Wendt in 1931 to give German casualties at Verdun from 21 February to 31 August 1916 as 336,000 German and 365,000 French at Verdun from February to December 1916. David Mason wrote in 2000 that there had been 378,000 French and 337,000 German casualties. In 2003, Anthony Clayton quoted 330,000 German casualties, of whom 143,000 were killed or missing; the French suffered 351,000 casualties, 56,000 killed, 100,000 missing or prisoners and 195,000 wounded.

Writing in 2005, Robert A. Doughty gave French casualties (21 February to 20 December 1916) as 377,231 and casualties of 579,798 at Verdun and the Somme; 16 per cent of the casualties at Verdun were fatal, 56 per cent were wounded and 28 per cent missing, many of whom were eventually presumed dead. Doughty wrote that other historians had followed Winston Churchill (1927) who gave a figure of 442,000 casualties by mistakenly including all French losses on the Western Front. R. G. Grant gave a figure of 355,000 German and 400,000 French casualties in 2005. In 2005, Robert Foley used the Wendt calculations of 1931 to give German casualties at Verdun from 21 February to 31 August 1916 of 281,000, against 315,000 French. (In 2014, William Philpott recorded 377,000 French casualties, of whom 162,000 had been killed; German casualties were 337,000 and noted a recent estimate of casualties at Verdun from 1914 to 1918 of 1,250,000).

紀念

凡爾登戰役紀念獎章

凡爾登已經成為法國最為人所知的第一次世界大戰代表性事件。安托萬·普羅斯寫到「如奧斯威辛一般，凡爾登象徵著對人類處境極限的侵犯」。 從1918年至1939年，法國發起兩次大規模的紀念，第一次是在戰場上建造的紀念碑與引用由羅貝爾·尼維爾所述的「他們絕不能通過」的愛國主義觀點，第二次則是以倖存者的角度回想他人的死亡、受難與犧牲。1920年，凡爾登城堡舉行一項儀式，選定一位烈士的遺體將其埋葬於凱旋門下的無名戰士墓。

弗勒里德旺杜奧蒙附近戰場的凡爾登紀念碑，開放於1967年，獻給陣亡士兵與平民

Six destroyed villages in the area were not rebuilt but were given special status as uninhabited communes of Beaumont-en-Verdunois, Bezonvaux, Cumières-le-Mort-Homme, Fleury-devant-Douaumont, Haumont-près-Samogneux and Louvemont-Côte-du-Poivre. Alain Denizot included period photographs that show overlapping shell craters in an area of about 39 sq mi（100 km²）. Forests planted in the 1930s have grown and hide most of the Zone rouge (Red Zone) but the battlefield remains a vast graveyard, containing the mortal remains of over 100,000 missing soldiers, except for those discovered by the French Forestry Service and laid in the Douaumont ossuary.

In the 1960s, Verdun became a symbol of Franco-German reconciliation, through remembrance of common suffering and in the 1980s it became a capital of peace. Organisations were formed and old museums were dedicated to the ideals of peace and human rights. On 22 September 1984, the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl (whose father had fought near Verdun) and French President François Mitterrand (who had been taken prisoner nearby in the Second World War), stood at the Douaumont cemetery, holding hands for several minutes in driving rain as a gesture of Franco-German reconciliation.

畫廊

• 
  凡爾登戰役的紀念品，上有一名法軍士兵
• 
  2005年拍攝的凡爾登戰場的一部分，顯示火砲轟炸的痕跡
• 
  《凡爾登戰役的場景》，由費利克斯·瓦洛東繪製於1917年

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• Terraine, J. The Smoke and the Fire, Myths and Anti-myths of War 1861–1945 repr. Leo Cooper. London: Sidgwick & Jackson. 1992 [1980]. ISBN 978-0-85052-330-0. 
• Windrow, M. The Last Valley: The Battle of Dien Bien Phu. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 2004. ISBN 978-0-297-84671-0. 
• Williams, C. A Life of General De Gaulle: The Last Great Frenchman. Hoboken, NJ: Jossey Bass. 1998. ISBN 978-0-471-11711-7. 
• Wynne, G. C. If Germany Attacks: The Battle in Depth in the West Greenwood Press, NY. London: Faber & Faber. 1976 [1939]. ISBN 978-0-8371-5029-1. 

百科全書

• Dupuy, E. R.; Dupuy, T. N. The Harper's Encyclopaedia of Military History: From 3,500 BC to the Present 4th. New York: Harper Reference. 1993 [6 October 2019]. ISBN 978-0-06-270056-8.  含有內容需登入查看的頁面 (link)

期刊

• Barcellini, S. Memoire et Memoires de Verdun 1916–1996 [Memory and Memoirs of Verdun 1916–1996]. Guerres Mondiales et Conflits Contemporains (Paris: Presses universitaires de France). 1996, 46 (182): 77–98. ISSN 0984-2292. JSTOR 25732329. 
• Förster, W. Falkenhayns Plan für 1916 ein Beitrag zur Frage: Wie gelangt man aus dem Stellungskrieg zu Entscheidungsuchender Operation? [Falkenhayn's plan for 1916: A Contribution to the Question: How to get out of Trench Warfare and Attain a Decisive Decision?]. Militärwissenschaftliche Rundschau 2nd part 3 (Berlin: Mittler). 1937. ISSN 0935-3623 （德語）. 
• Krumeich, G. "Saigner la France"? Mythes et Realite de la Strategie Allemande de la Bataille de Verdun ["Bleed France"? Myths and Reality of the German Strategy of the Battle of Verdun]. Guerres Mondiales et Conflits Contemporains (Paris: Presses universitaires de France). 1996, 46 (182): 17–29. ISSN 0984-2292. JSTOR 25732324 （法語）. 

延伸閱讀

書籍

• Afflerbach, H. On a Knife Edge: How Germany Lost the First World War [Auf Messers Schneide: Wie das Deutsche Reich den Ersten Weltkrieg verlor]. 由Buckley, Anne; Summers, Caroline翻譯 Hbk. Cambridge University Press. München: C. H. Beck. 2022 [2018]. ISBN 978-1-108-83288-5. 
• Bourachot, A. Marshal Joffre: The Triumphs, Failures and Controversies of France's Commander-in-Chief in the Great War. 由Uffindell, A.翻譯 Hbk. Pen & Sword Military, Barnsley. Paris: Bernard Giovanangeli Éditeur. 2014 [2010]. ISBN 978-1-78346-165-3. 
• Brown, M. Verdun 1916. Stroud: Tempus. 1999. ISBN 978-0-7524-1774-5. 
• Holstein, C. Walking Verdun. Barnsley: Pen and Sword. 2009. ISBN 978-1-84415-867-6. 
• Keegan, J. The First World War. London: Hutchinson. 1998. ISBN 978-0-09-180178-6. 
• MacKenzie, D. A. The Story of the Great War. Glasgow: Blackie & Son. 1920. OCLC 179279677. 
• McDannald, A. H. The Encyclopedia Americana 38. New York: J. B. Lyon. 1920. OCLC 506108219. 
• Martin, W. Verdun 1916. London: Osprey. 2001. ISBN 978-1-85532-993-5. 
• Mosier, J. The Myth of the Great War. London: Profile Books. 2001. ISBN 978-1-86197-276-7. 
• Romains, J. Prélude à Verdun and Verdun [Prelude to Verdun and Verdun] Prion Lost Treasures. Paris: Flammarion. 1999 [1938]. ISBN 978-1-85375-358-9 （法語）. 
• Rouquerol, J. J. Le Drame de Douaumont [The Drama of Verdun]. Paris: Payot. 1931. OCLC 248000026 （法語）. 
• Sandler, S. (編). Ground Warfare: an International Encyclopedia. International Warfare Encyclopedias from ABC Clio I. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO. 2002. ISBN 978-1-57607-344-5. 
• Serrigny, B. Trente Ans avec Pétain [Thirty Years with Pétain]. Paris: Librairie Plon. 1959. OCLC 469408701 （法語）. 
• Zweig, A. Education Before Verdun [Erziehung vor Verdun]. 由Sutton, Eric翻譯 2nd. trans. Viking Press, New York. Amsterdam: Querido Verlag. 1936 [1935]. OCLC 1016268225. 

期刊

• Bruce, Robert B. To the Last Limits of Their Strength The French Army and the Logistics of Attrition at the Battle of Verdun 21 February – 18 December 1916. Army History (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History). 1998, 45 (45): 9–21. ISSN 1546-5330. JSTOR 26304799. 

論文

• Sonnenberger, M. Initiative Within the Philosophy of Auftragstaktik: Determining Factors of the Understanding of Initiative in the German Army 1806–1955 (學位論文). Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College. 2013 [12 June 2014]. OCLC 875682161. 

外部連結

• NASA satellite map
• Map of the Verdun battlefield, showing fortifications
• Underground at Verdun
• The Battle of Verdun
• Info from firstworldwar.com
• Verdun (excerpt)
• Dutch/Flemish Forum
• Verdun, A Battle of the Great War
• Douaumont Bataille Ossuaire Three panoramas
• Map of Europe, 1916
• The Battle of Verdun – The Greatest Battle Ever
• Sturm-Bataillon Nr. 5 (Rohr) at German Wikipedia
• Contemporary Schneider artillery catalogue
• Chlumberg, H. "The Miracle at Verdun"